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Ireland
The Separation of Powers Doctrine
vs. Socio-economic Rights?
Aoife Nolan*
1. INTRODUCTION
The Irish Constitution is the oldest in Europe and
predates the international human rights discour-
ses, including those regarding socio-economic
rights. Its framers expressly included only one
socio-economic right (the right to education) in
the document, preferring instead to set out 'the
principles for the State to apply towards the pro-
motion of the people as a whole in the socio-
economic field'! in the form of non-justiciable
'principles of social policy'. In the words of one
commentator, while Eamon de Valera,~ the lead-
ing figure in the drafting of the constitution, clev-
erly genuflected before socio-economic rights, he
made sure to insert them in a part of the constitu-
tion that is prima facie unenforceable.3
Despite the lack of provision for a comprehen-
sive range of socio-economic rights under the Irish
Constitution. a number of judges have handed
do\Vll decisions resulting in the direct or indi-
* Aoife Nolan is Assistant Director of the Human Rights
Centre and Law Lecturer at Queen's University, Belfast.
The author would like (() thank Professor Gerry \Vh)1e
and Claire McHugh for helpful comments on earlier
drafts. Thl' input of Ciaran O'Kelly. Rory O'Connell and
(Ina Breatnach is also gratefully acknowledged.
I Constitution Review Group. Report of the Constituti01l
Rer1ieul Group (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1996). p. 391
('CRG').
2 The Constitution was primarily the work of Eamon de
Valera. President of the Executive Council of the Irish Fret'
State, who oversaw. and was heavily involved in. its draft-
ing.
J G. Quinn. 'Rethinking the Nature of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in the Irish Legal Order', in C. Costello
(ed.), Fundamental Social Rights: Currt>1It European Legal
Protection and the Challenge ofthe Ell Charter on Fum/a-
memal Rights (Dublin: Trinity College. 2001), pp. 35-54,
at 49.
rect protection of socio-economic rights. However,
concerns about the implications of adjudication of
socio-economic rights for the separation of PO\N-
ers and the involvement of the courts in what have
been deemed issues of 'distributive justice' has, in
more recent times, resulted in a genera] reluctance
on the part of courts to recognise and give proper
effect to such rights.4
2. PROTECTION OF SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER
THE IRISH CONSTITUTION
2.1 Overview of Relevant Provisions
The Constitution contains a \vide range of socio-
economic, rights-related provisions of both a jus-
ticiable and non-justiciable nature. Article 42 pro-
vides that:
4. The State shall provide for free primary
education and shall endeavour to supplement
and give reasonable aid to private and cor-
porate educational initiative, and. when the
public good requires it. provide other educa-
tional facilities or institutions with due regard,
however, for the rights of parents, especially in
the matter of religious and nl0ral fornlation.
5. In exceptional cases, where the parents for
physical or moral reasons fail in their duty
4 There is also a range of statutory socin-economic rights
provided for under Irish law. However, this chapter
focuses primarily on those socio-economic rights that
arise under the Constitution. Furthermore. while there is
no doubt thal the supremacy of EU law over constitu-
tional law may have future implications for Irish consti-
tutionallaw on socio-economic rights. the (thus far negli-
gible) impact ofFU law on constitutional socio-economic
rights jurisprudence is not dealt with in this chapter.
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towards their children, the State as guardian
of the common good, by appropriate means
shall endeavour to supply the place of the par-
ents, but always with due regard for the natu-
ral and imprescriptible rights of the child.
The duty set out in the latter sub-section necessar-
ily has a corresponding right, which can be used as
the basis of a claim against the State.
Many of the socio-economic rights accorded
under the Irish constitution are 'unenumerated'
personal rights, which are primarily guaranteed
under article 40.3.1 of the Constitution. This pro-
vision states that: '[tjhe State guarantees in its
laws to respect, and, as far as practicable by its
laws to defend and uindicate the personal rights
of the citizen' lemphasis added]. It is clear that
this article imposes a duty on the State to take
positive action in appropriate circumstances.s In
Ryall v. The Attorney General, Justice Kenny in the
High Court held that the 'personal rights' men-
tioned in article 40.3.1 are not exhausted by the
rights to 'life, person, good name and property
rights' expressly enumerated in the follo\ving sec-
tion 40.3.2 ,6 a position confirmed by the Supreme
Court in the same case.:- Court-identified, unenu-
merated (i.e. unvvritten) socio-economic rights
under article 40.3.1 include various rights of the
child,8 the right to bodily integrity,9 including the
right not to have health endangered by the State,IO
and the right to work or to earn a livelihood. II
The Irish Courts have therefore been prepared to
recognise that the Constitution protects unenu-
merated socio-economic rights, although only the
first t\vo of the rights just mentioned have been
held to give rise to a positive obligation on the
State.
In addition, civil and political rights have the
potential to serve as sources of socio-economic
rights under the Constitution or to be applied in
such a way as to protect socio-economic rights. 12
5 G. Why1e. Social Inclusion and the Legal System - Public
Interest Lau' in Ireland (Dublin: Institute of Public Admin-
istration. 2002), p. 19.
~ 11965] IR 294, at 312-3 (' Ryan v. Attorney Generaf).
, Ibid. p. 344.
R See section 4.5 below.
9 See Ryan v. Attorney General (n. 6 above), p. 313.
10 See The State (e) v." Frawley [1976J IR 365, as discussed in
section 4.1. below.
11 See section 4.2 below.
12 See section 4.1 below.
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Article 45 of the Irish Constitution provides that:
The principles of social policy set forth in this
Article are intended for the general guidance
of the Oireachtas. The application of those
principles in the making of laws shall be the
care of the Oireachtas exclusively and shall
not be cognisable by any Court under any of
the provisions of this Constitution. [Emphasis
added] 13
These principles have clear implications for the
enjoyment of socio-economic rights. For example,
article 45.2(ii) requires the State to direct its pol-
icy towards securing that the ownership and con-
trol of the material resources of the community
may be so distributed amongst private individu-
als and the various classes as best to subserve the
common good. Meanwhile, in article 45(4)(i), the
State pledges itself to safeguard with especial care
the economic interests of the weaker sections of
the community, and where necessary, to con-
tribute to the support of the infirm, the widow, the
orphan, and the aged.
I will not discuss these directive principles in any
detail, since the primary focus of this chapter is
justiciable socio-economic rights under the Irish
Constitution. 14 It should be noted, however, that
article 45 has been used by the Irish courts as an
interpretive instrument with regard to, amongst
other things, the identification of unenumerated
personal rights under article 40.3 of the Constitu-
tion. One example is the case of Murtagh Proper-
ties v. Cleary,15 in which Justice Kenny in the High
Court referred to the directive principle in arti-
cle 45.2(i) that' [t]he State shall, in particular, direct
its policy towards securing (i) That the citizens (all
of whom, men and women equally, have the right
to an adequate means of livelihood) may through
their occupations find the means of making rea-
sonable provision for their domestic needs '. He
held that the parenthesis recognises the right to
13 The Houses of the Oireachtas - Dail Eireann and Seanad
Eireann - are the Irish houses of parliament.
14 For more on the content and judicial treatment of Article
45, see G. \Vhy1e and G. Hogan (eds.), J.M. Kellv: the Irish
Constitution, 4th edition (Dublin: Butterw0l1hs, 2003).
pp. 2077-86; and (i. Hogan, 'Directive Principles, Socio-
Economic Rights and the Constitution', Irish Jurist, Vol. 36
(200 I), pp. 174-98, at 179-81. For more on the evolution of
the directive principles, see Whyte and Hogan, }.M. Kelly,
ibid. pp. 175-9.
15 [19721 IR 330 ('MurtaKJz Properties').
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an adequate means of livelihood and, while this
is not enforceable against the State, its existence
logically entails that each citizen has the right to
earn a livelihood. He continued to state that the
phrase 'all of whom, men and women equally'
shows that the right is one conferred equally on
men and women. Justice Kenny commented that
the statement in article 45 on non-cognisability
means that the courts have no jurisdiction to con-
sider the application of the principles in article 45
in the making of laws. However, this does not mean
that the courts may not take article 45 into consid-
eration when deciding whether a claimed consti-
tutional right exists. 16
Hogan and Whyte have observed that there has
been a progressive minimisation of the effect
of the exclusion in article 45 but that this
has not yet been considered by the Supreme
Court. 17 The reluctance displayed by Irish courts
towards addressing or employing directive princi-
ples in their decisions contrasts sharply \\rith the
approach adopted by courts in other jurisdictions.
such as India.
2.2 Horizontal Application
While the wording of articles 40.3.1 ,I B 42.4 and
42.5 refer expressly to the duties of the State to give
effect to constitutional rights, the Irish Supreme
Court has made it clear that constitutional rights
(including socio-economic rights) may have direct
horizontal effect and are not binding on the State
alone.
The most significant case dealing \\rith this issue
is that of Meskell v. L1E. 19 Here the defendant
employers agreed with trade unions to terminate
the contracts of employment of all their employ-
ees and to offer each employee immediate re-
employment upon the same general terms as prior
to the termination if he agreed. as a special and
additional condition of his employment, to be
'at all times' a member of one of the four trade
unions. Pursuant to that agreement, the plaintiff's
contract of eOlployment was terminated by the
Ib See also Minister for Posts and Telegraphs v. Paperlink
[1984j1LRM 373.
17 Whyte and Hogan. f.M. Kellv (n. 14 above), p. 2083.18 . •
See p. 296 above.
IY 1197311R 121 ('MeskeIl1.
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defendants. The plaintiff was not re-employed by
the defendants as he refused to accept the special
condition.
The Supreme Court held that the right of citi-
zens to form associations and unions. guaranteed
by article 40.6.10 of the Constitution, necessarily
recognised a correlative right to abstain from join-
ing associations and unions. In this case. the plain-
tiff was entitled to damages because, amongst
other things. he had suffered loss caused by the
defendant employers' conduct in violating a right
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. The Court
stated, per Justice VValsh, that:
It has been said on a number of occasions
in this Court ... that a right guaranteed by the
Constitution or granted by the Constitution
can be protected by action or enforced by
action even though such action may not fit
into any of the ordinary forms of action in
either common law or equity and that the
constitutional right carries \\rithin it its own
right to a remedy or for the enforcement of
it. Therefore, if a person has suffered damage
by virtue of a breach of a constitutional right
or the infringement of a constitutional right,
that person is entitled to seek redress against
the person or persons who have infringed that
right.20
The Court expressly agreed \vith the statements of
Justice Budd in Educational Company of Ireland
Ltd v. Fitzpatrick (No. 2),21 that 'if one citizen has
a right under the Constitution there exists a correl-
ative duty on the part of other citizens to respect
that right and not to interfere \vith it'.22 It has been
observed that the defendant in A-leskellwas a selni-
state nationalised corporation - and hence not
an entirely private entity.23 In subsequent cases,
however, Irish courts have held that constitutional
rights can apply horizontally to purely private
bodies.2-t
'>0
.. Ibid.. p. 133.
21 (1961) IR 345. p. 368 [emphasis added].
22 Afeske/l (n. 19 above), p. 133. See also. Justice Costello's
statements in Hosford v. l\lllrplzy & Sons Ltd 119881 ILRM
300. at 304.
23 C. O·Cinneide. 'Grasping the Nettle: Irish Constitutional
Law and Direct Effect' in J. Fedtke and D. Oliver (eds.).
Human Rights in the Pril'llte Sphere (London: Cavendish.
') 2007), 213. p. 220.
..4 See, e.g.. Gloper \'. BU\, Limited [19731 IR 388. where the
defendants were the board uf directors of a private com-
pany. Here. the Supreme Court stated that 'public policy
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There is very limited socio-economic rights-
specific case law dealing with the issue of hori-
zontal application and most of those cases that do
exist involve the right to earn a livelihood or the
right to education.25
2.3 The Potential of International Law
Ireland has ratified many of the international
instruments that have been invoked by advocates
bringing socio-economic rights litigation before
courts and other decision-making bodies. These
include the International Covenant on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights CICESCR'), the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child ('CRC'), the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
CICCPR'), the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
and the dictates of constitutional justice require that
statutes, regulations or agreements setting up machinery
for taking decisions which may affect rights or impose lia-
bilities should be construed as providing for fair proce-
dures'
25 See. e.g., Murtagh Properties (n. 15 above) in which Kenny
Jstated that 'It follows that a policy or general rule under
which anyone seeks to prevent an employer from employ-
ing men or women on the ground of sex only is prohib-
ited by the Constitution' (p. 336) lemphasis added]. See
also [ouett v. Gogan 11995] I I.L.R.M. 12, which involved
the right to livelihood. See also, Crowley v. Ireland 11980J
IR 102 and C01zwa.l/ v. Irish National Teachers Organisa-
ti01Z119911 ILRM 497, which centered on the right to pri-
mary education. A further socio-economic, rights-related
example is Hosford v. Murphy & Sons Ltd (n. 22 above).
This case concerned an action taken against factory own-
ers by children whose father had suffered a severe electric
shock and permanent brain damage whilst working for
the defendants in their factory premises. Amongst other
things, the decision focused on article 42(1), according to
which the State is obliged 'to respect the inalienable right
and duty of parents to provide, according to their means,
for the religious and moral. intellectual. physical and
social education of their children'. Costello J in the High
Court opined that the rights which Mr Hosford enjoyed
under article 42.1 did not include an ancillary right not
to be injured by a negligent act which interfered with his
ability to exercise his rights vis-a-vis his children. Hence,
his children would not enjoy any implied ancillary right
that their father would not be negligently injured and the
defendants' negligent act did not infringe any of their arti-
cle 42 rights. It is important to note that, while denying
the existence of the constitutional rights asserted by the
plaintiffs. the Court stated that if the plaintiffs could have
established that the defendants were guilty of a breach of
a constitutionally imposed duty which inflicted harm on
the plaintiffs then damages would have been recoverable
even though at common law an award in respect of such
harm could not be made.
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('CERD') and the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CCEDAW'). Ireland's dualist system requires that
its international obligations be expressly incorpo-
rated into domestic law in order for them to be
enforceable before the national courts.26 This has
not occurred in relation to any of the UN human
rights instruments that Ireland has ratified and,
hence, their provisions (socio-economic or other-
wise) are not directly enforceable by the national
courts. The Supreme Court has stated that, in the
absence of such incorporation, the principles of
international treaty law do not prevail over domes-
tic legislation?;' furthermore, the Supreme Court
has held that, under article 29 of the Constitu-
tion, international law confers no rights capable of
being invoked by individuals. 2H This finding does
26 Article 29(6) of the Constitution states that: 'No interna-
tional agreement shall be part of the domestic law of the
State save as may be determined by Parliament'. For more
on the impact of this provision, see, amongst others, the
statements made by the Supreme Court in the follow-
ing dt.>cisions: Re (] Lliigleis 119601 I.R. 93; Application oj
Woods 11970] IR 154: Kal'anaglz \'. GOI'l'rnor of Mountjoy
Prisotl 120021 3 I.R. 97; Norrisv. Art. Gen 119841 IR 3, and
Crom'v. An Taoiseach II987jl.R. 713.
27 See 5umers Jennings v. Furlong 11966] IR 183. However,
the same is not necessarily true of customary interna-
tionallaw, which may have a more forceful effect in Irish
municipal law. There havl> been several cases in which
the courts have taken the vie\v that principlt.>s of cus-
tomary international law form part of domestic law by
virtue of article 29(3), see \Vhyte and Hogan, /.A1. Kelly
(n. 14 above), p. 492. For a discussion of the incorpo-
ration of customary intemational law into Irish law and
the relationship of customary international law and Irish
municipal law, set.> C. R. Symmons, 'The Incorporation
of Customary International Law into Irish Law' in G.
Biehler (ed.). International Law in Practice: An Irish Per-
spectiue (Dublin: Thompson RoundhaJl, 2005), pp. 111-
183. However. principles of customary international law
may only be regarded as incorporated into Irish domes-
tic law where they are not contrary to the provisions of
the Constitution, statute law or common law. In Hor-
gan v. Taoiseach 120031 2 I.L.R.M. 357. the High Court
stated that, where a conflict arises between a principle of
international law and domestic constitutional. statutory
or other judge-made law, 'the rule of international law
must in every case yield to domestic law' (at 393). For an
exhaustive treatment of the interaction of international
law and domestic law in the Irish context, see Whyte and
Hogan, /.M. Kelly (n. 14 above), pp. 492-500.
2H Section 29(3) states that 'Ireland accepts the generally
recognised principles of international law as its mle
of conduct in its relations with other States'. Accord-
ing to Fennelly J in KQlJanagh v. GOlJernOr of Moun-
tjoy Prison (n. 26 above): 'The obligation of Ireland to
respect the invoked principles is expressed only in the
sense that it is to be' its rule of conduct in its relations
with other States. 'No single word in the section even
Ireland
not auger well for those seeking to place reliance
on international instruments in an attempt to
secure rights being denied by the domestic legal
order.2<J
Several judges have, however, been willing to
recognise that while not binding on courts, inter-
national agreements may have a persuasive value,
and have used such instruments as an aid to the
interpretation of national rules.:~o For instance,
in the case of O'DollogJzue v. The Minister for
Health,]) discussed below, Justice O'Hanlon in
the High Court referred to education-related pro-
\risions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and various articles of the CRC. The Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedonls ('ECHR'), in
particular, has been called on in aid by various
Irish judges to justify the 'discovery' of unenumer-
ated rights, although not in the socio-economic
area. 32
Overall, however, Irish courts have not proved
receptive to argun1ents based on international
law - including instrulnents providing for socio-
econolnic rights. Indeed. the reluctance of the
arguablv f'xpresse~ an intention to conft>r right-; capablt>
of being invoked by individual~' lp, 12(1). This -;tatement
was quoted appro\'ingly by Justict> "earns in the High
Court in Horgan \'. An Taoiseach 12003] 2 IR 4l'H.
2~1 G. Hiehlt.>r. 'International Law Procedures', in G. Biehler,
[t>d.). International Lauo il1 Practice: An Irish Perspectil'e
(Dublin: Thompson Roundhall. 2005). pp. 184-2·10. at
197-8. r\ more po~itivl' aspect of the Kamnagh and Hor-
gal1 dt>cisions i~ that. in both cases, thl' plaintiffs werl'
allowed to bring tlwir claims based on international la\\
before the courts and obtained a decision on the merits
\ibid. pp. I !-lH-~} J. Biehler points out that there have heen
numerous instann's of international law-hased argu-
ments being rul1y heard by Irish courts. notwithstanding
that those arguments havt> ultimately been rejectt>d (ihid.
pp.200l.
]0 F Ryan, Constitutional Lim' (Dublin: Round Hall. 2001),
p. 55. It has also bt.'en suggestt>d that unincorporated
international agreempnts may alsu havt.' indirect It:-'gal
effect through the opt>ration of a presumption of com-
patibility of donwstic legislation with international obli-
gations, see Whyte and Hogan, /.At. Kelly (n.14 abovel.
p.553.
3) 11~!-l6121H 20. Hereinafter. 'O'[)oT1oghuc' or the '()'[)o-
f/ogllue caSt".
:~2 1..1\\' Society of Ireland, Human RigJlls l.aw (2004), p. 37.
Spe. e.g.. lIewwy \', Ireland 1199413 IH 593. in which
Costel1o J in the High Court il1vokt'd Article 14(3llg1 oftlw
ICCPR. as well as the European Court of Human Rights'
interpretation of Article 6 of the ECI-IR. to support his
idt>ntiflcation of the right to silence as a latent constitu-
tional guarantee (ibid.).
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Irish courts to take international law, including the
ICESCR, into account arguably amounts to a vio-
lation of the State's obligations under the ICESCR.
in light of, amongst other things, the UN Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights'
statements in its General Comment No.9 on the
Domestic Application of the Covenant.33
2.4 Right to Civil Legal Aid for
Socio-Economic Rights Litigation
Despite the fact that Ireland \....as a party in possi-
bly the most celebrated case involving a regional
hunlan rights body recognising the right to civil
legal aid, Airey v. lreland,34 the Irish courts have
traditionally been highly reluctant to recognise a
constitutional right to civil legal aid.35 Recently,
there has been a move towards judicial recog-
nition of an unenumerated constitutional right
under article 40.3.1 to ci\rillegal aid in certain cir-
cumstances. In o 'Donoghue \'. Legal Aid Board,Jli
the plaintiff was seeking a divorce and mainte-
nance. She had experienced a delay of twenty-five
months bet\veen contacting the Legal Aid Board
for legal aid and ultimately obtaining a legal aid
certificate. In the High Court. Justice Kelly held
that the plaintiff had a constitutional right to ci\·il
legal aid derived from her constitutional right of
access to the courts and her constitutional right to
33 lJ:\ Doc. E1CILi 19!-lH/24. The Committpe stated that 'it
is generally accepted that domestic la\\ should be inter-
preted as far as possible in a way in which conform~
III a State's intt>rnational It>gal obligations. Thus, when a
domestic decision maker is faced with a choict> bt>tween
an interpretation of domestic law that \..-ould place the
state in hreach of the CO\'enant and one that would
enabll' the Statl' to comply with the C(wenant, interna-
tionallaw requires tht> choice of the latter'. IAt para. 15 '.
]·1 (19801 2 EHRR 305.
:is An excl'ption to this are two decisions of Lardner J in the
early 1990s in the cases of St£>I'(,11$On \'. Land.,' lind oth-
ers. unreported. High Court, 10 February 1!-l~n, and J..:ir-
lI'an \'. .~1il1isrer for lllsrice 11994] I ILH\l 44·l, In these
cases. a right to ci\illegal aid \\-as recognised in the con-
text of wardship proct>l'dings and the executin' rl'\'il"w ot
the dett>ntion of an indiyidual found guilty hut insane,
n>specti\·ely. Rather than focussing on the existence of a
constitutional right to ci\'i1legal aid. tht.'se decisions n'n-
tred 011 thl' net>d for ci\'i1 legal aid in the particular cases
in order to ensure the constitutional requirements of fair
procedurl's. and that til(' courts should administer justice
with fairness, he gi\'t~n t>ffect to. I.ardner J's approach was
not followed hy other judges. however. hlT more on this.
see Whnc. 'Social Inclusion' (n. 5 ahove), pp. 246-254.
Jh 1200411-EHC -t U.
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fair procedures. Justice Kelly referred to previous
High Court decisions in which it was held that legal
aid was constitutionally mandated37 and stated
that 'it seems to me that the unfortunate circum-
stances of the plaintiff in the present case are
such that access to the courts and fair procedures
under the Constitution would require that she be
provided with legal aid'. He found that the Board
should have adhered to its own target of two to
four months benveen a person first making con-
tact with the Board and having a consultation with
a solicitor.
This decision was confirmed in Magee v. Minis-
ter for Justice, Equality and Lau.' Reform,3B Jus-
tice Gilligan in the High Court quoted Justice
Kelly's decision approvingly, holding that in this
case the plaintiff was constitutionally entitled to
be provided with legal aid for the purpose of
being adequately represented at the inquest into
her son's death while in garda (police) custody, It
remains to be seen whether or not the approach
of the High Court in these cases will be confirmed
by the Supreme Court, \Vhyte observes that the
reluctance of other judges to recognise a con-
stitutional right to civil legal aid, taken together
with the opposition expressed by leading mem-
bers of the Supreme Court in Sinnott v, Minister
for Educatiorr19 and TD v. Minister for Education40
(see below) to the judicial recognition of socio-
economic rights, might give rise to grounds for
pessimism on this point. This is despite the fact
that Justice Kelly's decision in o 'Donoghue brings
the constitutional position on civil legal aid nlore
into line with that of the European Convention on
Human Rights as stated in Airey.41
In Ireland, civil legal aid is primarily provided for
under legislation. Ireland has had a state-funded
legal aid scheme since 1979,42 Its current design is
based on the provisions of the Civil Legal Aid Act
1995 ('1995 Act'), which aims 'to make provision
for the grant by the State of legal aid and advice
to persons of insufficient means in civil cases',43
37 See the Ste/lenson and Kirwan cases (n. 35 above).
38 Unreported, High Court, 26 October 2006, pp. 11-13.
39 [20011 IESC63 ('Sinnott).
40 [20011 lESe 101 (TD).
41 In discussion with G. Whvte (1 June 2006).
42 Free legal Advice Centr~s. Access to Justice: A Right or a
Privilege? (Dublin: FLAC, 2005). p. 7.
4] Civil Legal Aid Act 1995. Cited in Free Legal Advice Cen-
tres. Access to justice (n. 42 above), p. 7.
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The 1995 Act provides for the establishment of a
Legal Aid Board whose primary functions include
the provision of legal aid and advice in civil cases
to persons who satisfy the requirements of the
Act.44
In terms of the 1995 Act, legal aid45 and advice
will not be granted by the Legal Aid Board in
respect of a number of matters, For the purposes
of socio-economic rights litigation, it is important
to note that these include representative actions
and class actions.46 This has clear implications for
those seeking to bring collective socio-economic
rights claims. That said, the Act provides that an
application for a legal aid certificate shall not be
refused 'by reason only of the fact that a suc-
cessful outcome to the proceedings for the appli-
cant would benefit persons other than the appli-
cant',47 The Act also expressly states that legal aid
will not be granted in relation to 'test cases',48
Furthermore, the fact that the Legal Aid Board
is not permitted to provide representation before
administrative tribunals (with the exception of the
Refugee Appeals tribunal)4Y means that legal aid is
unavailable to those seeking to enforce their socio-
economic rights-related entitlements before bod-
ies such as the Social Welfare Appeals Office, the
Equality Tribunal or the Employment Appeals Tri-
bunaL Finally, under the Act there is a blanket
exclusion of housing matters with some very lim-
ited exceptions, which has very serious implica-
tions for those of limited means threatened with
losing their homes.5o
44 1995 Act. Section 5(1).
45 Legal aid is defined in Section 27(1) of the 1995 Act as:
'representation by a solicitor of the Board. or a solicitor
or barrister engaged by the Board under Section 11. in
any civil proceedings to which this section applies and
includes all such assistance as is usually given by a solic-
itor and. where appropriate, barrister in contemplation
of. ancillary to or in connection with, such proceedings,
whether for the purposes of arriving at or giving effect to
any settlement in the proceedings or otherwise'.
46 Section 28(9J(a)(vii), (ix).
47 Section 28(9)(d).
48 Section 28(9)(a)(viii).
49 In 1991. the Legal Aid scheme was extended to apply
to proceedings before the Refugee Appeals Tribunal by
Ministerial Order.
50 For instance, the 1995 Act fails to cover proceed-
ings brought under the Housing Act 1966 ('1966 Act').
including proceedings seeking recovery of possession of
dwellings from occupants of local authority accommoda-
tion under Section 62 of the 1966 Act. The High Court has
found on two occasions that there is no right to legal aid
under the constitutions in relation to defending eviction
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The Legal Aid Board has been criticised for pri-
oritising family law and child care over any other
kind of law. The Free Legal Advice Centre ('FLAe')
points out that there is significant demand for
assistance in the areas of debt, employment, hous-
ing and social welfare law (all of which have
clear implications for socio-economic rights) that
are not being met by the current civil legal aid
scheme. 51 In addition, FLAC has argued that the
nlerits test provided for under the 1995 Act is prob-
lematic,5~ highlighting that the criteria establish-
ing whether applicants 'merit' legal aid include no
provision that civil legal aid should be available to
a person who needs it in order to access justice.
This is despite the fact that the right to legal aid
is based on that need.53 In the past, the financial
eligibility requirements set out under section 29 of
the 1995 Act were criticised as too harsh. 54 How-
ever, in September 2006, these were reformed by
means of ministerial regulation.
Finally, there are major problems in relation to
how the scheme operates in practice. There have
been numerous complaints about the inadequate
money, staff and other resources allocated to the
Legal Aid Board and about resultant delays expe-
rienced by those seeking civil legal aid. This has
improved since O'Donoghue v. Legal Aid Board,
however, with increased resources being made
available to the Board and waiting lists being
reduced.
Having highlighted the shortcomings of the statu-
tory systelTI in terms of providing for legal aid
for social rights litigation, it is important to note
the role that the Irish Human Rights Commission
('Commission') may play in this context. \\There
an applicant does not qualify for assistance under
the Civil Legal Aid Act, the Criminal Justice (Legal
Aid) Act 1962 or otherwise, the Conlmission may
proceedings taken hy local authorities in terms of Section
62(3) of the 1966 Act. due to the fact that. according to the
Coun, eviction proceedings taken hy public authorities
are straightfonvard and relatively simple. involving the
establishment of certain strdightforward proofs. ([)uhlin
Corporation v. Hamilton, unreported. High Court, 19 June
1998; Hymn'. Scally and Dublin Corr1Oration, unreported.
High COllrt, 12 Octoher 2(00).
51 Free Legal Advice Centres, Access to Justice (n. 42 ahove).
p.35.
:):! See Section 24 of the] 995 Act.
S:l Free Legal Advice Centres. Access to Justice (n. 42 ahove).
p.52.
54 lhid.
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choose to provide (or arrange the provision of)
legal advice, legal representation or such other
assistance as the Commission deems appropriate
in the circumstances.55 Furthermore, the Commis-
sion may institute proceedings for the purpose of
obtaining relief of a declaratory or other nature
in respect of any matter concerning the human
rights56 of any person or class of persons.57
All in all, however, there is extremely limited
civil legal aid available to those seeking to for-
ward socio-economic rights claims before the Irish
Courts.
3. BACKGROUND TO THE CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH OF THE IRISH COURTS
The landmark High Court decision of O'Reilly \'.
Linlerick Corporation:)H can be regarded as the ori-
gin of the contemporary and dominant approach
of the Irish Supreme Court to socio-economic
rights. In this case, the plaintiffs were members
of the Traveller community, living in conditions of
extreme deprivation. They initiated legal proceed-
ings against the local authority. seeking a manda-
tory injunction requiring the authority to provide
serviced halting sites under the Housing Act 1966.
They also asserted that the State should pay them
damages for sufferings, which they had undergone
in the past. This latter claim was based on an alle-
gation that the conditions which the plaintiffs had
been required to endure amounted to a breach of
their constitutional rights. They asserted that the
right to be provided with a certain IninimulTI stan-
dard of basic nlaterial conditions to foster and pro-
tect someone's dignity and freedonl as a hunlan
55 The Human Hights Commission Act 2000. Section 10.
56 'Human rights' for the purposes of Section 10 mp<lIlS (al
constitutional rights or (bi rights guaranteed:
to persons hy any agreement. treaty or convention
to which the State is a party and which has heen
given the force of law in the State, or hy a pro\'ision
of any such agreement. treaty or convention which
has been given such force.
s/ Similarly. where the case has strategic importanrt:> or
may set a preced(>nt. the Equality Authority. at its dis-
cretion. may provide free legal assistance [() those mak-
ing complaints of discrimination under the EmploYllll'nt
Equality Act 1998 and the Equal Status .\ct 2000. St.'l'
tn.>e Legal Advice Centres. Access to /IJsrice (11. 42 ahove),
p. g.
:lH 119R911.L.R.M.IBl,'O·Reil/,"orthe'O'Reil/\'rasf.."l.
302
person was one of the unenumerated personal
rights embraced under article 40.3.2,-.59
The presiding judge, Justice Costello, claimed not
to have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the claim. He
argued that. in doing so, he would be adjudicat-
ing on an allegation that the organs of government
responsible for the distribution of the nation's
wealth had improperly exercised their powers.
According to Justice Costello, the Aristotelian dis-
tinction behveen commutative and distributive
justice marks out the dividing line between the
judicial and legislative spheres of operation.5o The
courts are limited to dealing with issues of com-
mutative justice, while the distribution of public
resources (Le. goods held in common for the ben-
efit of the entire community):
!C]an only be made by reference to the com-
mon good and by those charged with fur-
thering the common good (the Government);
[distribution of public resources] cannot be
made by any individual who may claim a
share in the common stock and no indepen-
dent arbitrator, such as a court, can adjudicate
on a claim by an individual that he has been
deprived of what is his due. 61
Justice Costello continued:
\Vhat would be involved in the exercise of the
suggested jurisdiction would be the imposi-
tion by the court of its view that there has been
an unfair distribution of national resources.
To arrive at such a conclusion it would have
to make an assessment of the validity of the
many competing claims on those resources,
the correct priority to be given to them and
the financial implications of the plaintiff's
claim. As the present case demonstrates, it
may also be required to decide whether a cor-
rect allocation of physical resources available
for public purposes has been made. In exer-
cising this function the court would not be
administering justice as it does when deter-
mining an issue relating to commutative jus-
tice but it would be engaged in an entirely dif-
ferent exercise, namely an adjudication on the
fairness or otherwise of the manner in which
other organs of State had administered pub-
lic resources. Apart from the fact that mem-
59 Ibid. at 192.
~o Whyte and Hogan, I.M. Kelly, (n. 14 above), p. 116.
61 ()'Reillvln. 58 above), p. 194.
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bers of the judiciary have no special qualifica-
tions to undertake such a function, the man-
ner in which justice is administered in the
courts, that is, on a case by case basis, makes
them a wholly inappropriate institution for
the fulfilment of the suggested role. I cannot
construe the Constitution as conferring it on
them.62
The analysis of distributive and commutative jus-
tice employed by Justice Costello in O'Reilly is
arguably unsuitable for application to cases in
which the State has failed to vindicate a citizen's
socio-economic rights. It would seem that such
cases should actually be classified as commuta-
tive/rectificatory justice as they involve a wrong
in the form of a breach of a constitutional right
of a citizen: any remedy granted is aimed towards
rectifying the wrong committed by the State.63
Admittedly, such a remedy will usually involve,
as a knock-on effect, the distribution of pub-
lic resources; it is, however, merely a secondary
symptom of the case, as is the distribution of pub-
lic resources stemming from an award of damages
in a case where a servant of the state commits a
tort6-1 or violates a civil and political right.
Justice Costello ultimately dismissed the claim
stating that in order to comply with the Constitu-
tion, such a petition should 'be advanced in Lein-
ster House rather than in the Four Courts'.65 In
doing so, he appeared to fail to recognise the often
very limited ability of vulnerable and marginalised
groups, such as the one at issue in this case, to
ensure that their socia-economic rights are vindi-
cated or forwarded through the democratic sys-
tem as a result of, amongst other things, a lack of
organisational ability or political clout, as well as
the existence of hostility or indifference towards
them by the elected branches of government
and/or a majority of the electorate. Some groups
that are particularly vulnerable to violations of
their socio-economic rights - for instance, chil-
dren and other disenfranchised groups - are effec-
tively precluded from 'advancing their petition in
Leinster House '. This is due to both their express
62 Ibid. p. 195.
63 C. O'Mahony, 'Education, Remedies and the Separation
of Powers', Dublin University Law Journal, Vol. 24 (2002),
pp. 57-95, at 76.
64 Ibid.
65 O'Reilly (n. 58 above). p. 195. Leinster House is the seat 01
the Irish parliament.
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exclusion from the democratic decision-making
processes as well as, in many instances, their
inability to rely on other (enfranchised) members
of society to ensure the 'virtual' or indirect repre-
sentation of their interests in such processes.6n
4. SELECTED RIGHTS
4.1 Protection of Socio-Economic Rights
by Means of 'Civil and Political' Rights
There are several civil and political rights-related
provisions of the constitution that could be used as
a basis for indirect protection of socia-economic
rights.67 For instance, an expansive interpretation
of the right to life protected by article 40.3.2 of
the Constitution could give rise to socio-economic
rights being protected by means of that right.
Indeed, in rejecting calls for the explicit inclu-
sion in the Irish Constitution of guarantees of
socio-economic rights, the Constitution Review
Group concluded that, where anyone falls below
a minilTIum level of subsistence, the Constitution
appears to offer ultimate protection through judi-
cial vindication of fundamental personal rights
such as the right to life and the right to bodily
integrity.6H
In addition to being employable to indirectly pro-
tect socio-economic rights-related interests. the
right to life under the Constitution may also serve
as a basis for the identification of socia-economic
rights. This was clearly demonstrated by the deci-
sion in Ryan v. AG. Here, a woman challenged
the fluoridation of the public water supply on
the grounds that this constituted, amongst other
6G for more on the 'virtual representation' of minority
groups in majoritarian decision-making processes, see J.
Ely. Democracy & Distrust: A Theory of judicial Rel';eu'
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).
67 By 'indirect protection' I mt>an wh'ere other non-socio-
economic rights art> applied or interpreted by the courts
so as to protect socin-economic rights-related interests.
6fl CRG (n. ] above), p. 236. The prohibition on torture, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment set out in
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(and incorporatt>d into Irish domestic law by the ECHR
Act 2003) can arguably perform a similar function. Courts
in the United Kingdom have accepted that intolerable liv-
ing conditions for which the State is responsible can con-
stitute a violation of Article 3: see King's chapter on the
United Kingdom in this volume for an overview of the rel-
evant cases.
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things, a violation of her and her children's per-
sonal rights under article 40.3. In that case, Jus-
tice Kenny in the High Court held that 'water today
is a necessity of life and that the Plaintiff proba-
bly has a right of access to a supply of water'.69
On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was accepted
by the Attorney General that water is one of the
essentials of life, and 'that man therefore has an
inherent right to it'.70 In its judgment, the Supreme
Court did not take issue with this point. These
dicta would appear to indicate that the right to
life under article 40.3.2 encompasses the right
to water. There have, however, been no further
judicial statements on this issue. Another exam-
ple of the right to life being interpreted expansively
to encompass socio-economic rights is the deci-
sion of G v. An Bord Uchtilla:71 Here, Justice Walsh
stated that the right to life 'necessarily implies the
right to be born, the right to preserve and defend
(and to have preserved and defended) that life, and
the right to maintain that life at a proper human
standard in matters of food, clothing and habita-
tion'.";"Z
The unenumerated personal right to bodily
integrity that has been judicially identified as pro-
tected by article 40.3.1 could perfornl a similar
function. The case of The State (C) v. Frawley;"!!
concerned a prisoner who was suffering from a
sociopathic personality disorder. According to
the opinion of a clinical psychologist (which was
not disputed by the State), the prisoner required
expensive treatment in a highly specialised psy-
chiatric unit, which was not available in Ireland
and would only be appropriate to the needs of the
prisoner and a very small number of other people.
The High Court held that the right to bodily
integrity operated to prevent an act or omission
on the part of the Executive, which, \\:ithout jus-
tification or necessity, would expose the health of
a person to risk or danger. -4 The Executive is thus
constitutionally obliged to protect the health of
persons held in custody as \vell as was reasonably
possible in all the circumstances of a case.";"S The
Court found, however, that the failure on the
h~ 1196511R 294. at 315.
70 Ibid. p. :{42.
71 [198011R 32 (·(;\·..-tBU).
;2 lbid. p. 69.
73 [19761 IR 365 (' Fmwlev').
";"-1 Ibid. p. 372. .
";"5 Ibid. See also The State (Richardson) v. The GOl'ernor 0..1
,\loun tjoy Prison! 19801 ILRM 82.
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part of the Executive to provide the prisoner with
expensive treatment in a special institution of
a kind that was not present in Ireland did not
constitute a failure to protect his health as well as
was reasonably possible in all the circumstances
of the case. 76
On a related note, there are judicial statements
suggesting that there is an unenumerated right
to health protected by the Constitution, indepen-
dent of the right to bodily integrity. In the case of
Heeneyv. Dublin Corporation,77 Justice O'Flaherty
of the Supreme Court stated that, it was 'beyond
debate that that there is a hierarchy of constitu-
tional rights and at the top of the list is the right
to life, followed by the right to health and with that
the right to the integrity of one's dwellinghouse'.7R
However, the parameters of this judicially identi-
fied right to health are somewhat unclear, to say
the least. 79
There has been at least one instance of a court
holding that the unenumerated right to bodily
integrity imposes a positive obligation on the state.
The case of O'Brien v. Wicklow UDcY° concerned a
claim by travellers that the State, acting thorough
the local authority, had a duty to provide serviced
halting sites for them. Justice Costello found that
the deplorable conditions under which the plain-
tiffs were living infringed their constitutional right
to bodily integrity.81 Having considered the defen-
dant local authority's statutory powers to provide
serviced halting sites under the Housing Act 1988
in light of the plaintiff's constitutional right to
bodily integrity, he held that the local authority
was under a legal duty to provide such sites and
he granted a mandatory order directing that the
{6 Frawley (n. 73 above), pp. 372-3.
77 [1998j1ESC 26.
78 Ibid. para 16. In this case. the plaintiffs had sought an
injunction commanding Dublin Corporation to take cer-
tain steps in relation to the breakdown in the elevalOr ser-
vices in the Ballymun flats complex. in the City of Dublin.
In granting the injunction, O'Flaherty J stated the corol-
lary of the constitutional guarantee of inviolability of the
dwelling of every citizen must be that a person should be
entitled to the freedom to come and go from his dwelling
provided he keeps to the law.
79 See the discussion of In re Article 26 and the Health
(Amendment) (No.2) Bill 2004 12005) lESe 7 for further
discussion on the existence of a right lO healthcare under
the Constitution. Hereinafter .In re Article 26 and the
Health (Amendment) (No.2) Bilr.
80 Unreported. High Court 10 June 1994.
81 Ibid. D. 4.
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defendants to provide at least three serviced halt-
ing sites.82 It should be noted however that this
was only an ex tempore judgment and hence has
extremely limited precedential value. The decision
is also probably at odds with the later Supreme
Court findings in the cases Sinnott v. Minister for
Education83 and TD v. Minister for Education.B4
Certainly, thusfar, the Supreme Court (as opposed
to lower courts) has not interpreted the right to
bodily integrity so as to encompass social and eco-
nomic rights within it.8s
4.2 Labour Rights
There are a large number of Irish cases dealing
with labour rights. Indeed, article 40.6.] (iii) sets
out the right of the citizens to form associations
and unions. In this chapter. however, I will focus in
particular on the right to work/earn a livelihood.
In Tierney v. The Amalgamated Society of Wood-
workers,86 Justice Budd of the High Court agreed
with the assertion that the right to work and earn
one's livelihood, as an unenumerated right, is just
as important a personal right of the citizen as a
right to property and just as much entitled to vin-
dication under article 40 of the Constitution. He
went on to conclude, however, that the failure of
a trade union to submit an individual's name for
membership of the union or to hold an election,
even though the individual was qualified for mem-
bership in accordance with the rules of the trade
union, did not amount to any infringement of the
Constitution.
Subsequently, as discussed in Section 2.] above,
the right to an adequate means of livelihood was
recognised in the High Court case of Murtagh Pro-
perties.B7 In the later case of Murphy iI. Stewart/J,8
82 In doing so. Costello J withdrew from the stance he had
adopted in the O'Reilly case. He stated that. 'I don't think
it is necessary to say whether I am now expressing a dif-
ferent view to the one which I expressed in the case of
O'Reilly and Ors v. Umerick Corporation.... Even, how-
ever, if the view which I am now expressing represents a
change of views on my part. then I accept my views have
changed ... ' (ihid. pp. 3-4).
83 N. 39 ahove.
84 N. 40 above.
85 There is, however, evidence that they might be prepared
to do so in the future. See the discussion of In re Article 26
and the Health (Amendment) (No.2) Bill for more on this.
86 I] 959) IR 254.
87 See n. ]5 above.
88 119731 IR 97.
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the Supreme Court stated that, while cItizens
have a constitutional right to form associations
and unions under article 40.6.1) (iii), there is no
constitutional right to join the union of one's
choice. Referring to Murtagh Properties, Justice
Walsh accepted that among the unspecified per-
sonal rights guaranteed by the Constitution is the
right to work. He stated that if the right to work
was reserved exclusively to members of a trade
union which held a monopoly in this field and the
trade union was abusing the monopoly in such a
way as to effectively prevent the exercise of a per-
son's constitutional right to work, the question of
compelling that union to accept the person con-
cerned into membership (or, indeed, of breaking
the monopoly) would fall to be considered for the
purpose of vindicating the right to work.89
The courts have made clear that the freedom to
exercise the constitutional right to earn a liveli-
hood is not absolute and that it may be subject
to legitimate legal restraints.90 It is also primar-
ily a negative right: in Shanley v. Galway Corpo-
ration/JI the High Court stated that the Constitu-
tion 'does not impose a positive duty either on
the State, or on any body such as a local author-
ity to which the State may have delegated pow-
ers, to provide a livelihood for the plaintiff'.92 In
Greally v. Minister for Education (No. 2),'l'j Justice
Geoghegan in the High Court stated that 'because
a person has a right to a particular livelihood
it does not mean that he has a right to receive
employment from any particular employer'.94 The
Courts have held, however, that statutory restric-
tions on the right to earn a livelihood must be clear
and that such restrictions nlust not be dispro-
portionate.95
89 See also Yeates v. ,\1inister for Posts and Telegraphs 11978]
ILRM 22: Parsons v. Kal'aTlagll !19901 ILRM 560; LOl'ett v.
(;oRan, 119951 1 I.L.H.M. 12: Murtagh Properties v. Cleary
119721 IR330.
90 Irish Human Rights Commission, Making Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights Effectil'e: All IHRC DisCU-lisioll
/)ocument (Dublin: IHRC, 2(05), p. 112.
I.lI 119951 I IR 396.
CJ2 Irish Human Hights Commission, 'Making ESC Rights
Effective' (n. 90 above). p. 112.
93 119991 1 IR 1.
94 Ibid.
95 Irish Human Hights Commission In. 90 above), p. 112.
See, e.g., Coxv. Ireland 1199212 IR 503. For a detailed anal-
ysis of the right to work/earn a livelihood. see J. Casey,
Constitutional Law in Ireland (Dublin: Roundhall, 2000).
pp. 404-410.
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4.3 Social Security Rights
Rights to social welfare entitlements are granted
by statute, rather than under the constitution, so
these will not be discussed at length. The Supreme
Court has held that the right to receive benefit or
retain benefit wrongly paid derives from statute
and does not partake of the nature of a constitu-
tional property right.96 It is worth noting, however,
that despite the absence of any constitutional pro-
vision setting out a right to social security, judicial
application of the principles of natural and con-
stitutional justice has significantly improved the
legal position of the welfare claimant who wishes
to challenge a departmental decision affecting his
or her rights under the welfare code.97 Attempts to
protect social security rights-related entitlements
through reliance on the constitutional guarantee
to equality before the law have been generally
unsuccessful,9H largely due to the couns' employ-
ment of a highly restrictive 'invidious discrimina-
tion test'.99 There have, however, been instances
in which plaintiffs have relied successfully on arti-
cle 41 (in particular article 41.3.1 obliging the
State to protect the institution of marriage from
attack), \vhich enshrines the constitutional protec-
tion of the fanlily unit, in challenging discrimina-
tion against married couples under welfare legis-
lation. lOo
96 ,\li1lister for Social. Community and Family Affairs Y.
Scanlon 12001 J lESe 1. at 17.
97 \\lhyte, 'Social Inclusion' In. 5 above), p. 124.
9R Article 40.1 of the Constitution. See, e.g., :\lIlic.\lIUltlllJna
v. Attorney General [19951 1 IR 484: Dennehy v. AJillister
for Social Welfare, unreported, High Court. 26 July 1984:
Lou/til v. MinL'\ter for Social ale/fare 11999] 1 ILRM 5.
99 See the Supreme Coun decision in OBrien v. Keogh 11972]
IR 144, at 156. in which the Court stated that '(a)rticle 40
does not require identical treatment of all persons v.ith-
out recognition of differences in relevant circumstances.
lfootnote omitted I It only forbids in\idious discrimina-
tion'. See also per Kenny J in Alurplzy v. Attorney Gen-
eral 119821 IR 241. at 283 where he stated the court will
set a legislative inequality aside as being repugnant to
the Constitution if any state of facts exists which may
reasonably justify it (see Murphy l'. The Attorney General
[19821 1R 241. at 283 and 284l. The Couns have since
distanced themselves from the 'itwidious discrimination
test, employing a 'rationality test' in a number of equal-
ity cases. The author is. however. unaware of any cases
involving social security rights to which this test has been
applied.
IOU Hyland v. .~1inister for Social \lelfare 119891 JR 624: J.H.
\'. Eastern Health Board 119881 IR 747. Unsuccessful
attempts to rely 011 Article 41 include MlzicAfhathllna
In. 98 above).
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4.4 The Right to Education
The right to education is set out in article 42. 101
In particular. article 42.4 provides that' [t]he State
shall provide for free primary education and shall
endeavour to supplement and give reasonable aid
to private and corporate educational initiative.
and. when the public good requires it. provide
other educational facilities or institutions with due
regard. however. for the rights of parents. espe-
cially in the matter of religious and moral forma-
tion'. Quinn has suggested that the inclusion of the
right to education in the Irish Constitution had less
to do \vith the substantive right to education of the
child per se and more to do with preserving the
arrangement between the funders of education
(the State) and the providers of education (reli-
gious bodies and parents) prevailing at the time
at which the Constitution was being drafted. 102 In
practice. however. the courts have begun separat-
ing out the substantive right from the tangled his-
torical arrangements and have enforced it against
the State so as to require education facilities and
opportunities of a certain quantity as well as qual-
ity.lO:i
It has been established that the article imposes
both a duty to provide free primary education and
a right to receive such education. 104 It does not
necessarily place a duty on the State to provide
free primary education itself, but rather enjoins
it to provide for such education by ensuring that
machinery exists under which. and in accordance
with which, such education is provided (e.g. by
funding private institutions which provide pri-
mary education) .105 While there is an explicit
obligation on the State to provide for primary edu-
cation. court decisions have been crucial in delin-
eating the precise parameters of this duty.
lOl There are other Constitutional articles which might have
a bearing on the provision of primary education in the
absence of a specific articulation of that duty, (e.g. Arti-
cle 40.3.1 (which provides protection for personal rights
unenumerated in the Constitution), the guarantee of
equality before the law contained in article 40.1 and,
arguably, article 42.1. In this chapter, however, I shall
focus exclusively on those provisions that expressly guar-
antee that right.
102 Quinn, 'Rethinking the Nature of ESC Rights' (n. 3 above),
p.49.
103 Ibid.
104 See Crowleyv. Ireland (n. 25 above), at 122.
105 Ibid. p. 126'.
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In O'Donoghue v. Minister for Health. 106 the mo-
ther ofa severely mentally disabled 107 eleven-year-
old boy instituted legal proceedings against the
Ministers for Heath and Education. She sought an
order from the High Court directing the defen-
dants to provide for free primary education for her
son and also a declaration that, in failing to pro-
vide for such education, the State had deprived
him of his constitutional rights under articles 40
and 42. Up until the initiation of legal proceedings.
State support for the child's education had been
limited and wholly inadequate and the major pan
of such education as he had received was the result
of private funding.
The State argued, amongst other things. that (a)
the applicant, by reason of being profoundly men-
tally and physically disabled, was ineducable. and
all that could be done for him to make his life
more tolerable was to attempt to train him in
the basics of bodily function and movement; and
(b) the education that the State was obliged to
provide pursuant to article 42.4 was education
of a conventional, scholastic nature, and that
such training as could be provided to the plain-
tiff could not be regarded as 'primary education'
within the meaning of that expression as used in
article 42.4.
In the High Court, Justice Q'Hanlon referred to
the definition of education set out by the Supreme
Court in the earlier case of Ryan v. A.G., in which
education was defined as 'the teaching and train-
ing of a child to make the best possible use of his
inherent and potential capacities, physical, mental
and moral'. 108 In light of this definition, taking into
account the advances made internationally in the
area of education for children who suffer from a
severe or profound mental handicap, as well as the
evidence (which was to the effect that the appli-
cant had made good progress and could make fur-
ther progress), he held that the applicant was not
ineducable.
With regard to the second argument, the judge
examined the dictionary definitions of the terms
106 See n. 31 above.
107 There are four categories of developmental disability (or
'handicap' which was the term employed by the Court in
this case): 'mild', 'moderate', 'severe' and 'profound'.
lOR See n. 6 above. n. 350.
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used in both the Irish and English versions of arti-
cle 42.4. 109 He then stated that:
There is a constitutional obligation on the
State by the provision of Article 42.4 of
the Constitution to provide for free basic
elementary education of all children and
that this involves giving each child such
advice, instruction and teaching as will enable
him/her to make the best possible use of
his/her inherent and potential capacities,
physical, mental and moral, however limited
these capacities n1ight be. I 10
He went on to say that as soon as it had been
established in the 1970s that children vvith a severe
nlental handicap were educable, there arose a
constitutional obligation on the part of the State
to provide for free primary education for such
children. He held further that education for pro-
foundly handicapped children could correctly be
described as 'primary education' \vithin the mean-
ing of the phrase used in article 42.4. 111
Having considered a large volume of documen-
tary evidence, as well as oral evidence, on the
approaches adopted to the education of such chil-
dren in numerous other jurisdictions, the judge
stated that the evidence in the case gave rise to a
strong conviction that, in order for primary edu-
cation to meet the special needs of such peo-
ple, a new approach from that currently available
would be required in respect of the pupil-teacher
ratio, the age of commencement, and continuity
and duration of education. \Vhile Justice O'Hanlon
did not actually prescribe a pupil-teacher ratio, he
made it clear that the ratio of one-to-twelve would
not discharge the State's obligations under arti-
cle 42.4 to profoundly handicapped children. In
relation to age of commencernent, he pointed out
that early intervention and assessment was of\'ital
J 04 Ttw Constitution was drafted in two languages, Irish and
English, by two different authors almost simultaneously,
with each co-author borrowing from the other's work.
'tVhere the texts clash, the national language, Irish, takes
precedence (Article 25(4) oftht> Constitution).
110 O'[)orlOgJzue (n. 31 above), p. 65. O'Hanlon J's comments
were subsequently expressly accepted by McGuinness) in
the High in Comerford v. Minister for Education Il~971 2
ILRM 134, 144. She also accepted the applicant's lawyer's
assertion that 'the right to free primary education extends
to every child, although the education provided must vary
in accordance with the child's abilities and needs'. (ibid.
p. 143).
III oDol10ghue (n. 31 above), p. 67.
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importance if conditions of mental and physical
handicap were not to become intractable. Further-
more, with regard to duration. he stated that the
process ofeducation should ideally continue for as
long as the ability for further development was dis-
cernible. IIL
The judge made an order declaring that the
respondent, in failing to provide for free pri-
mary education for the child and in discriminat-
ing against him as compared with other children,
deprived him of constitutional rights arising under
article 42 of the Constitution. He also granted
damages. II J
This case made it clear that the State's obligation
under article 42.4 covers all children in the State
and that special measures have to be put in place
for those children who, because of their disabil-
ity, are unable to benefit fronl conventional edu-
cation. However, the issue of the right to primary
education of adults remained unresolved.
The right to primary education of adults was the
subject of the case of Sinnott \'. .Minister for Edu-
cation. I 14 Here, the plaintiff was a severely autistic
twenty-three-year-old man. Despite a campaign
conducted over two decades by his mother, the
State had failed to provide him \vith any consistent
suitable training or education. In these proceed-
ings. the applicant and his mother sought declara-
tions as to their constitutional rights, a mandatory
injunction directing the Minister to discharge the
State's obligations to the plaintiff and damages for
negligence and breach of both constitutional and
statutory rights. The State argued, anlongst other
things, that the duty to provide for primary educa-
tion for the plaintiff ceased when he reached eigh-
teen years of age.
In the High Court, Justice Barr argued that there
is nothing in article 42.4 !hat supports the con-
tention that there is an age lin1itation on a citizen's
right to on-going primary education provided for
by the State. He pointed out that in the plaintiff's
case there was a fundamental need for continuous
education and training which was not age-related.
II:! Ibid. p. 70.
113 The case was appealed by the State. On 6 february 1997,
the Supreme Court made the order that the plaintiff \\'a~
entitled to free primary education in accordance with
article 42.4 and the High Court \ order was otherwise con-
firmed.
114 See n. 39 above.
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He argued that, in the absence of a specific provi-
sion in the constitutional article, it would be wrong
to imply any age limitation on the constitutional
obligation of the State to provide for the primary
education of those who suffer severe or profound
mental handicap. IIS Thus, the ultimate criterion
in interpreting the State's constitutional obligation
was 'need' and not 'age'. I 16
The case was appealed by the State to the Supreme
Court, which was required to determine two key
points. First, the extent of the right to free pri-
mary education under article 42.4, and, second,
the right of the High Court, having regard to the
doctrine of the separation of powers, to grant a
mandatory injunction formulating and directing
the application of future policy in relation to edu-
cational needs. The Court's findings in relation to
the latter point \vill be dealt \vith later in this chap-
ter in Section 7.
The Court found for the State on both issues. The
majority took the view that the State's duty to pro-
vide, for free, primary education applies to chil-
dren only, not adults, and that the duty ceased
to apply even in the case of a person with severe
mental handicap once the age of eighteen was
reached. The judges argued that article 42 located
education in the context of the family and that the
word 'child' had a clear age-related meaning in this
context. \Vhile any age would be arbitrary to some
extent, the age of eighteen was reasonable as the
age at which society no longer treated a young per-
son as a child. One judge went so far as to say the
obligation ended when a child reached twelve -
that is, the age at which an ordinary child could
be taken to have finished primary school! 117 Only
one judge, Chief Justice Keane, agreed with Justice
O'Hanlon in the High Court that the State's obliga-
tion was open-ended.
The definition of 'primary education' set out by
Justice Barr in the High Court was not challenged
by the State before the Supreme Court. However,
all the judges, with the exception of Justice Murphy
(who argued that the training required by Mr. Sin-
nott could not be described as education under an
originalist interpretation of article 42.4), seemed
satisfied that Justice Barr's definition was correct.
115 (2000) IEHC 148, para. 85.
116 Ibid. para. 86.
117 Per Murphy J in Sinllot (n. 39 above), para. 236.
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Thus, while the Court accepted the broad defi-
nition of the substantive content of the right to
primary education set out in O'Donoghue, it pro-
ceeded to define the category of people entitled to
assert this right in a very narrow 'age-' rather than
'need' -centred way.
The judicial reluctance to become involved in
so-called distributive justice issues, as demon-
strated in O'Reilly, had previously been reiterated
in several cases and confirmed by the Supreme
Court. IIB The issue arose again in Sinnott. Here,
Justice Hardiman dealt expressly with the ques-
tion of the power of the court to ensure that a
person's constitutional rights (including those of a
socio-economic nature) were not circumvented or
denied. Having quoted Justice Costello's judgment
in O'Reilly approvingly and at length,I19 he stated
that, apart from in an extreme case where the gov-
ernment would ignore a constitutional imperative
and defy a court declaration on a topic, the courts
should refrain from exercising such a power. They
should do so for several reasons. Firstly, were the
courts to exercise such a power, this would offend
the constitutional separation of powers. 120 Sec-
ondly, it would lead the courts into the taking
of decisions in areas in which they have no spe-
cial qualification or experience. Thirdly, it would
permit the courts to take such decisions even
though they are not, and cannot be, democrati-
cally responsible for them as the legislature and
executive are. Finally, the evidence-based adver-
sarial procedures of the court, which are excel-
lently adapted for the administration of commu-
tative justice, are too technical, too expensive, too
focused on the individual issue to be an appropri-
ate method for deciding on issues of policy. Justice
Hardiman continued:
Central to this view Iof the separation of pow-
ers] is a recognition that there is a proper
sphere for both elected representatives of the
people and the executive elected or endorsed
by them in the taking of social and economic
and legislative decisions, as well as another
sphere where the judiciary is solely compe-
tent l21 ... [I]f judges were to become involved
in such an enterprise, designing the details of
lIB E.g. see A1hicMhathlinav. Attorney Generall 19951 1 IR 484
and Frawley (n. 73 above).
119 Sinnott (n. 39 above). paras. 335-346.
120 Ibid. para. 374.
121 Ibid. para. 375.
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policy in individual cases or in general, and
ranking some areas of policy in priority to oth-
ers, they would step beyond their appointed
role. 112
The rigid and conservative view of the separation
of powers doctrine expressed by Justice Hardiman
in this case foreshadowed the Supreme Court's
holding in the TD case, which is discussed in Sec-
tion 4.5.
A later case involving the right to education once
again raised the issue of the obligation imposed
by the State by article 42.4. In O'Carolan u. Min-
ister for Education,123 the parents of an autistic
boy with challenging behaviour sought, inter alia,
a nlandatory order requiring the State to pro-
vide appropriate education for their son. The State
had made a number of placement offers, none of
which the applicants thought adequate in terms
of being best suited to provide for their son's edu-
cational needs. The applicants wanted the State
to fund placement at a Centre for Developmen-
tal Disabilities abroad. The State's most recent
Dublin-based placement offer, which was at issue
in the case, was, in the view of the applicants and
expert witnesses, inappropriate, inadequate, and
not in accordance with international best prac-
tice. With regard to the conflict of evidence, Justice
MacMenamin in the High Court ultimately sided
with the State's experts, finding the Irish place-
ment to be suitable. However, the case is disturb-
ing as the Judge's interpretation of the right to
education would appear to involve a weakening
of the obligation imposed on the State by article
42.4. Justice ~1acMenanlin stated that the kernel
of the case was whether the State had breached
its duty, as set out under article 42 and identified
by Justice O'Hanlon in the case of o 'Donoghue.
He found that the facility put forward by the State
was 'objectively adequate and in compliance with
the constitutional duties of the respondents'. In
doing so, he stated that the test was not whether
the State's offer was better than that desired by the
plaintiffs or whether it was optimal. Rather,
the question was whether it was 'appropriate'.
O'Mahony observes that Justice fvfacMenamin's
decision that the test was not whether an alter-
native placement was better or the best so long
as the placement in question was appropriate to
I')')~- Ibid .. para. 377.
123 (200!)) IEHC 296.
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the needs of a particular child would appear to
run directly contrary to O'Hanlon's statement in
o'Donoghue that the 'education' contemplated in
article 42.4 should enable a child 'to make the
best possible use of his or her inherent and poten-
tial capacities'.124 It also contradicts Chief Justice
O'Dalaigh's comments in Ryan v. AG.
The decision is arguably of limited jurispruden-
tial value as, firstly, it is a High Court, rather than
a Supreme Court decision, and secondly, Justice
MacMenamin also failed to take into account any
authorities other than o 'Donoghue on the scope of
the right to education under article 42.4. 125 \Vorry-
ingly, however, a narrow conception of 'appropri-
ateness' was also used in a subsequent High Court
decision, O'c. v. l\tlinisterfor Education and Science
& Ors. 126 Here, Justice Peart held that the Minister's
failure to provide an autistic child \\rith a particular
form of autism-specific education \\rhich had been
demonstrated to be effective for that child did not
mean that the Minister had failed to 'provide for an
appropriate education as required by the Constitu-
tion' [emphasis addedj. Notably the judge in that
case did not cite the a 'CaroLan case or, indeed, any
major right to education decision.
It remains to be seen what approach will be
adopted by the Supreme Court. Should it choose
to embrace the approach of Justice Iv1acMenamin
in O'Carolan in future cases, this would have a sig-
nificant impact on the extent of the State's obliga-
tion under article 42.4. Indeed, it is arguable that
the way in which the scope of the education right
has been progressively curtailed through judicial
interpretation in an era of increased resources is
124 C. O·Mahony. 'The Right to Education and "Constirution-
ally Appropriate" Prmision'. Dublin Unil'ersity [-flU' Jour-
nal, Vol. 2R (2006). p. 422.
12S Ibid.
126 120071 IEHC 170. This case was a challenge brought
on behalf of a child with autism. His parents claimed.
amongst other things. that in failing to provide free edu-
cation and health care services for the child appropri-
ate to his needs. and in discriminating against the child
with respect to provision of appropriate educational and
health care facilities ,,;s-a-\is other children, the State had
deprived the child of his constitutional rights pursuant
to articles 40. 41 and 42 of the constitution. The Coun
concluded that the model of education prO\ided for the
child by the State was appropriate. In doing so. the Coun
emphasised that. when it camt.~ to deciding whether the
education model proposed by the State was appropri-
ate, it was not necessary for it to evaluate the alternative
model recommended by the parents. which had proved
beneficial to the child.
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out of step with Ireland's obligation under the ICE-
SCR to progressively realise economic and social
rights. 127
4.5 Children's Rights
The Constitution contains one proVIsIOn which
expressly furnishes children with a socio-econo-
mic right operable against persons other than the
State. Article 42.1 provides that parents are obliged
'to provide, according to their means, for the reli-
gious and moral, intellectual physical and social
education of their children'. The constitutional
duty imposed on parents by that article imposes
a corresponding right on children to seek the pro-
vision for such education from their parents where
their parents fail to provide SUCh. 12H Applying arti-
cle 42.5 to article 42.1, it would appear that where
parents fail in their duty to provide for the religious
and moral, intellectual, physical and social edu-
cation of their children, the State 'by appropriate
means shall endeavour to supply the place of the
parents'. It would thus seem that article 42.1 may
also serve as the basis for socio-economic rights
claims of children against the State. The extent
and nature of such a claim as might be made pre-
sumably depends on the interpretation adopted of
what is required of the State where they' endeauour
to supply the place of parents'.12!-l
127 In discussion with Claire McHugh (15 September 2006).
128 For more on this, see the statements of the High Coun in
A.G. \'. Dowse & Anar [2006] IEHC 64, where MacMenamin
J stated that' lalmongst the natural and imprescriptible
rights of [the child] to which this Coun must have due
regard is the right to have his needs, including his reli-
gious, moral. intellectual. physical and social education
provided for by the applicants [his adoptive parentsl in
accordance with their means'.
129 It should be noted that the language of article 41.3.1
of the Constitution ('The State pledges itself to guard
with special care the institution of marriage, on which
the Family is founded ... ') clearly restricts constitutional
recognition to families based on marriage. Thus. the
rights and duties set out in article 41 and 42 of the Con-
stitution apply to marital families and their members
only. It has been stated by the courts on several occa-
sions that the rights of children who are members of non-
marital families are personal rights guaranteed by article
40.3, rather than by articles 41 and 42. tor example, with
regard to article 42.5, in G lJ. An Bard Uchtala 119801 IH
32, Justice Walsh concluded that the State owed a similar
duty to protect children born outside the marital family as
that prescribed by article 42.5. In his view. this obligation
stemmed from article 40.3 of the Constitution. He con-
tinued to say that there was no difference between the
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By far the most significant body of jurispru-
dence on children's socio-economic rights centres
on children's unenumerated constitutional rights.
The unenumerated rights of the child were first
dealt with at length in G v. An Bord Uchtala. 130
Having upheld the right of a parent to the custody
and control of the upbringing of a daughter, Chief
Justice O'Higgins in the Supreme Court observed
that:
The child also has natural rights ... Having
been born, the child has the right to be fed
and to live, to be reared and educated, to
have the opportunity of working and of real-
ising his/her full personality and dignity as a
human being. These rights of the child (and
others which I have not enumerated) must
equally be protected and vindicated by the
State. In exceptional cases the State, under the
provisions of Article 42.5 of the Constitution,
is given the duty, as guardian of the common
good, to provide for a child born into a fam-
ily where the parents fail in their duty towards
that child for physical or moral reasons. 131
This ruling was built on in the High Court deci-
sion of FN v. Minister for Education.)]2 The' FN
case' involved a thirteen-year-old in state care who
suffered from hyperkinetic conduct disorder and
required a period of time in a secure unit that
could contain him safely while confronting his
behaviour. Having referred to the unenumerated
rights of the child mentioned by the High Court
and the Supreme Court in G v. ABU, and the fur-
ther elaboration of children's constitutional rights
by the Supreme Court in The Adoption (No.2)
Bill, 19871:n and M.E v. Superintendent Ballynlul1
obligations owed by an unmarried parent to their child
under article 40.3 and those owed by a married parent
under article 42.5. The constitutional amendment legisla-
tion presented in February 2007 (discussed in section 4.5)
sought to ensure an equitable standard of protection for
all children regardless of the marital status of their par-
ents. The Bill proposed replacing the existing article 42.5
with, amongst other things, a statement that '(i)n excep-
tional cases. where the parents of any child for physical
or moral reasons fail in their duty towards such child, the
State as guardian of the common good, by appropriate
means shall endeavour to supply the place of the parents,
but always with due regard for the natural and impre-
scriptible rights of the child' lemphasis addedl.
130 See n. 129 above.
131 Ibid. pp. 55-56.
132 1199511 IR 409. Hereinafter 'fN or the 'FNcase'.
133 [1989] I.R. 656.
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Garda Station, 134 Justice Geoghegan stated that: 'I
would take the view that where there is a child
with very special needs which cannot be pro-
vided by the parents or guardian, there is a con-
stitutional obligation on the State under article
42, s. 5 of the Constitution to cater for those
needs in order to vindicate the constitutional
rights of the child'.135 Such secure accommoda-
tion, services and arrangements as were neces-
sary to meet the requirements of FN were held to
be not so impractical or so prohibitively expen-
sive as to come within any notional limitation
on the State's constitutional obligations. 136 Justice
Geoghegan stated that he was of the view that
the State was under a constitutional obligation
towards the applicant to establish as soon as rea-
sonably practicable suitable arrangements of con-
tainment with treatment for the applicant. The
State did not appeal FN and, in the subsequent
case of DD v. Eastern Health Board l37 involving a
disturbed eleven-year-old boy, the Eastern Health
Board did not dispute that it o\ved a constitutional
duty to the child to meet his special needs and
accepted that it was in breach of this constitutional
duty.
The most important recent case focusing on chil-
dren's socio-economic rights is that of TD v. Min-
ister for Education. 138 The applicants in TD \vere
a sample of a large group of non-offending chil-
dren in the care of regional Health Boards Oocal
authorities), whose special needs were not being
met by the State. Due to a lack of treatment and
secure accommodation, the court was forced to
order the placement of such children in deten-
tion centres, police stations, hotels, adult prisons
and even adult psychiatric hospitals. nq In TD, the
Supreme Court heard an appeal against a deci-
sion of Justice Kelly in the High Court granting
a mandatory injunction directing the f\1inister to
take all steps necessary to facilitate the building
and opening of secure and high support units in
set locations with a prescribed number of beds
I:H 119911 1 IR 189.
u:; F.'V(n.132ahoveLp.416.
136 PPf Denham 1. T!) (n. 40 ahove), para. 103.
U7 Unreported. High Court, Costello J. 3 May 1995.
n8
. See n. 40 above.
139 R. Dooley & M. Corbett, 'Child Care, Juvenile Justice and
the Children Act 2001', JrL~h \'Olltllwork Scene: A Journal
for Youth \Vorkers, No. 36 (2002). available at <http:/ /
www.childrensrights.ie/pubs/ChildCareJuvenileJuslice.
doc:> (last accessed 1 May 2008)
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and in accordance with a fixed time-scale. 140 The
High Court made this decision primarily on the
basis of the right/obligation identified in the FN
case. The State's grounds of appeal chiefly cen-
tred on, amongst other things, the claim that, in
making of the orders under appeal, the High Court
had entered into questions of policy and usurped
the executive power in violation of the principle of
separation of powers. 141
All five Supreme Court Justices in the TD case
referred to Justice Costello statements in the
O'Reilly case approvingly. Even Denham J. who
ultimately disagreed strongly with the finding of
the majority, agreed with Justice Costello's rul-
ing in O'Reilly that the distribution of the nation's
wealth is a matter for the executive and the leg-
islature. 142 The heavy reliance of the majority of
the Court in TD and Sinnott on the reasoning and
authority of the O'Reilly case is open to question.
This is due to the failure of the majority of the
Supreme Court to recognise that while the plain-
tiffs in O'Reilly relied on a previously unidentified
unenumerated constitutional right, the applicants
in TD and Sinnott relied on rights expressly identi-
fied in the text of the Constitution and in previous
case law. \\There such rights have previously been
recognised as being protected by the constitution,
adjudication involving them involves no more of
a transfer of power to the judiciary at the expense
of other branches of government than adjudica-
tion involving 'traditional' civil and political rights
with implications for public expenditure and pol-
icy. Furthermore. in O'Reilly. Justice Costello did
not determine that there had been a breach of a
constitutional right. Rather he analysed the con-
cept of distributive justice. However, in TD the
applicants ,vere not making a case that the nation's
wealth be justly distributed. rather their cases were
140 TD (no 40 above). paras. 14-31. In an earlier case. DR \'.
Minister for Justice & Drs. 11998] IEHe 123, Kelly J had
already made a mandatory order. directing the respon-
dents la. amongst olher lhings. lake all steps neces-
sary to complete two de\'elopments in County Dublin
within the time scale specified by departmental offi-
cials in e\idence before the Court. and to ensure that
lhere was adequale secur(" high support accommodation
available for the applicant and for others with similar
needs. This decision was nOlo however, appealed by the
State.
141 For more delails on the State's submissions. see T/) (n. 40
above), paras. 4~9. per Keane J.
142 T/) (n. 40 ahove). para. 137.
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brought to protect recognised and acknowledged
constitutional rights. 143
In his judgment in TD, Justice Hardiman reiterated
his concerns about judicial involvement in areas
'more obviously within the ambit of the legisla-
tive or executive government',144 quoting approv-
ingly a commentator who argued that incorpo-
rating justiciable socio-economic rights into the
Constitution by referendum would mean a signifi-
cant transfer of power from the elected branches
of government to an unelected judiciary.14s The
other judges of the Court articulated similar views.
Justice Murphy expressly doubted the existence
of any socio-economic constitutional right apart
from the right to education set out in article 42,
stating that' !wlith the exception of the provisions
dealing with education, the personal rights identi-
fied in the Constitution all lie in the civil and polit-
ical rather than the economic sphere'.146 Another
member of the court expressed 'the gravest doubts
as to whether the courts at any stage should
assume the function of declaring what are today
frequently described as 'socio-economic rights'
to be unenumerated rights guaranteed by Arti-
cle 40'.147 Thus, the correctness of the rights identi-
fied in FNwere questioned directly or indirectly,I48
while two justices also appeared to question the
binding nature of the statement of the Chief Jus-
tice in G v. ABU, set out above. 149
The questioning of the rights enunciated in FN
by various members of the Supreme Court in TD
was done unilaterally, as the State did not dis-
pute the conclusions in the earlier case. Therefore,
these and other comments in relation to socio-
economic rights were obiter. One of the results
of this spontaneous questioning of FN by the
Supreme Court was that lawyers on both sides
were not given the opportunity to comment on,
attack or defend the ruling. It was suggested by one
Irish source that part of the reason for the Supreme
Court's decision to question FNwas that the Court
realised that if it accepted that FN was correctly
143 Per Denham J. TD, ibid. para. 137.
144 m, ibid. para. 241.
14S Ibid. para. 244.
146 Ibid. para. 167.
147 Ibid. per Keane CJ, para. 66.
148 Ibid. per Murphy J (paras. 172-6), Hardiman J (para. 260)
and Keane CJ (para. 66).
149 Ibid. per Murphy J (paras 173-176) and Keane CJ (para.
63-7).
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decided and, therefore, that the rights identified
by Justice Geoghegan existed, it would not make
sense to say that there was no way of enforcing
those rights.
In the earlier decision of North Western Health
Board v. W (H.), ISO three Supreme Court judges
mentioned FN in the context of discussing chil-
dren's unenumerated personal rights without
expressly declaring a reservation about the rights
declared in that case. lSI Thus, the rights recog-
nised by the High Court in FN must be regarded as
part of Irish constitutional law as it stands at the
moment. Although the Court's comments in TD
on the correctness of the judgment in FN and the
appropriateness of interpreting the Constitution
to include socio-economic rights were also nega-
tive, it must be recalled that they were obiter and
thus do not form part of a binding precedent.
In February 2007, the Irish Government published
the Twenty-eighth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion Bill 2007. The draft legislation provided for the
replacement of article 42.5 of the Constitution with
a provision explicitly recognising constitutional
rights of the child, other than those related to
primary education. Despite the recommendation
of a large number of children's rights advocates
that any proposed amendment should include a
statement of the child's socio-economic rights, the
wording put forward by the Government did not
make any express reference to such rights. How-
ever, the statement set out in the proposed pro-
vision article 42A.l that 'The State acknowledges
and affirms the natural and imprescriptible rights
of all children' left open the possibility for fur-
ther judicial 'discovery' or confirmation of unenu-
merated socio-economic rights of the child. Due
to the dissolution of government prior to a gen-
eral election in May 2007, the Bill fell. In Decem-
ber 2007, the Joint Committee on the Constitu-
tional Amendment on Children was established.
This Committee has been tasked to examine the
2007 Bill and to make any recommendations to the
wording of the proposed constitutional amend-
ment provided for in the bill that seem appropri-
ate to it. It remains to be seen what wording (if
any) will ultimately be put to the electorate and
it is unclear whether or not the Committee will
150 120011 IESC 70 (8th November, 2001).
151 Ibid. per Murphy J (para. 202), Keane CJ (para. 80) and
Denham J (para. 160).
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recommend the explicit inclusion of additional
socio-economic rights of the child in the Consti-
tution. Furthermore, it is not guaranteed that such
a proposed amendment would be carried if put to
the electorate by referendum.
5. THE DEATH KNELL FOR UNENUMERATED
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS!
The statements made by various members of
the Supreme Court in TD suggest that it is
unlikely that the Court, as currently constituted,
will be prepared to identify further unenumer-
ated constitutional socio-economic rights under
article 40.3.1 .152 However, the Supreme Court's
approach in the case In re Article 26 of the Con-
stitution and the Health (Amendmen t) (No. 2) Bill
2004153 would appear to signal a slight softening
in its stance. In this case, Counsel submitted that
the Constitution, and specifically the right to life
and the right to bodily integrity of such persons
as derived from article 40.3. r and 2~ , imposes an
obligation upon the State to provide at least a
basic level of in-patient facilities to persons in
need ofcare and maintenance who cannot provide
for it themselves. Interestingly, rather than reject-
ing the existence of such a right out of hand (as
might have been expected from its comments in
TD), the Court stated that, '[ijn a discrete case in
particular circumstances an issue may well arise
as to the extent to which the normal discretion of
the Oireachtas in the distribution or spending of
public monies could be constrained by a consti-
tutional obligation to provide shelter and mainte-
nance for those with exceptional needs'. 154
The Court did not consider it necessary to examine
such an issue in the circumstances that arose from
an examination of the Bill referred to it. Instead,
the Court focused on whether, assuming there is
such a constitutional right to maintenance, the
152 I note, however, that since TD, the personnel of the
Supreme Court have changed significantly with two
members of the majority in TV having retired. In addi-
tion, Geoghegan J. who decided FN, was appointed to the
Supreme Court in 1999 (although he was not on the panel
that heard the TV case). Consequently, despite the exis-
tence ofthat precedent. future efforts to litigate children's
socio-economic rights or seek mandatory orders may not
meet with as cold a reception as they did in the TD case.
1~ .See n. 79 above.
154 Ibid., per Murray J, para. 34.
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charges for which the Bill provided could be con-
sidered an impermissible restriction of any such
right. The Court did not consider, however, that it
could be an inherent characteristic of any right to
such services that they be provided free, regardless
of the means of those receiving them.
Counsel assigned by the Court argued alternatively
that the charges actually provided for in the Bill
would cause undue hardship to persons of limited
means who have, for a range of reasons, a spe-
cial need for maintenance by a Health Board in
receiving in-patient services. The Court held that
the real question was whether the charges were
such that they would so restrict access to the ser-
vices in question by persons of limited means as
to constitute an infringement or denial of the con-
stitutional rights asserted. It concluded that, on
the basis of the structure of the proposed statu-
tory scheme, they were not. One commentator has
observed that the fact that the Court upheld the
proposed charge for in-patient services only after
satisfying itself that the statutory regime would
not unduly deny access to these "ervices would
suggest, by implication, that legislation that did
unduly deny access to such services might be
regarded as unconstitutional. I5s
This decision is a positive (albeit limited) depar-
ture from the strident, 'anti-unenumerated socio-
economic rights' views expressed by the Supreme
Court in TD. However, as Doyle and \Vhyte point
out, before we conclude that the Supreme Court
is in the throes of undergoing a 'Pauline conver-
sion', particularly on the matter of implied con-
stitutional rights and socio-economic rights, it is
important to put the Court's decision in context. IS6
Doyle and Whyte observe that the Bill in question
was designed 'to shore up a policy that was kno\vn
to be legally invalid at least since 2001 and that
implementation of that policy had the \vhiff of bad
faith about it'.Is7 In their view it is more likely that
155 G. \Vhyte. 'Socia-Economic Rights in Ireland: Judicial and
Non-Judicial Enforcement'. paper presented at the Con-
ference on Economic. Social alld Cultural Rights: A1od-
els of Enforcement organised by the Irish Human Rights
Commission. Dublin, Ireland. 9-10 December 2005.
156 0. Doyle & G. \Vh~1e, 'The Separation of Powers and Con-
stitutional Egalitarianism after the Health (Amendment)
No.2 Bill Referrmce', in E. O'Dell (ed.). Older People i11
Modem Ireland: £.Wl}'S in Lalt' and Polic)' (Dublin: First-
law. 2006), pp. 393-426, at 425.
157 O'Dell, ibid., pp. 425-426. In 200 I, legislation was passed
that made it clear that people aged seventy and upwards
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the decision simply indicates that there are lim-
its to what even judicial conservatives will tolerate
from the other branches of government, and that
action taken in bad faith affecting constitutional
rights will never pass muster. IS8
6. CRITIQUE OF SUPREME COURT'S
APPROACH TO POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS
The restrictive approach adopted by the Irish
Supreme Court to socio-economic rights issues
is open to question on many grounds, including
the fact that the distinction between distributive
and commutative justice is hardly watertight. 159 It
is also debatable whether the Constitution does
erect an impenetrable barrier between the courts
and issues of distributive justice, in light of pro-
visions such as article 42.4, which would appear
to give parents and children a justiciable right
to insist that the State should finance primary
education. l60 Furthermore, there is no reason in
principle why distributive and commutative jus-
tice must be segregated in accordance with the
constitutional function of the person making the
decision, bearing in mind that the distinction
between the two kinds of justice 'is no more than
an analytical convenience, an aid to orderly con-
sideration of problems'.161 However, even if one
accepts the conventional view that the elected
branches of government are better equipped to
design schemes ofdistributive justice, while courts
are better at dealing \vith commutative justice,
that does not necessarily justify the Court adopt-
ing such a restrictive approach to socio-economic
rights issues. As mentioned previously during the
discussion of the O'Reilly case above, it is arguable
that in cases where the State has failed to vindicate
a citizen's constitutional socio-economic right,
the justice at issue is commutative rather than
were eligible for the relevant in-patient services free of
charge. From then on, there was no possible room for
doubt that Health Boards were not entitled to impose any
charges for in-patient services on persons aged seventy or
above. However, the practice continued.
158 Ibid. p. 426. For more on judicial refusals to countenance
'bad faith' on the part of government in the context of
remedies, see the statements of Murray 1. below at p. 23.
159 See Whyte, 'SocialInclusion' (n. 5 above), p. 13.
160 Ibid.
161 M. De BJacam, 'Children, Constitutional Rights and the
Separation of Powers', Irish Jurist, Vol. 36 (2002), pp. 113-
142, at ]31, citing J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural
Ri1{hts (1980). at 179.
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distributive in nature. Therefore, in such cases,
socio-economic rights issues will fall to be dealt
with by the courts. In addition, the majority of the
Supreme Court in TD appeared oblivious to the
reality that judicial decisions in relation to civil and
political rights can also have budgetary and policy
implications.
Hogan and Whyte have stated that, in the absence
of a subsequent decision reversing or qualifying
the Court's approach in TD, it can be presumed
that the Irish Supreme Court does not consider
the resolution of socio-economic issues that have
implications for public spending or policy to fall
within the judicial sphere of operations. 162 How-
ever, recent developments have made it clear that
this is not fully correct. In the case of In re Article
26 of the Matter of Article 26 of the Constitution
and the Health (Amendment) (No.2) Bill 2004,163
the Supreme Court struck down an attempt by
the government to retrospectively legalise illegal
nursing home charges to medical card holders,
finding that the attempt to retrospectively legalise
the charges involved the abrogation of a prop-
erty right protected by the Irish Constitution. 164 In
doing so, the Court expressly stated that the prop-
erty of persons of modest means must be deserv-
ing of particular protection, since any abridge-
ment of the rights of such persons will normally
be proportionately more severe in its effects. 165
According to government sources, repayments to
former patients and their families who were ille-
gally charged may cost the State between {SOO mil-
lion and {1.2 billion. This case demonstrates that
the Court does not hesitate to deal with socio-
economic issues that have implications for public
spending or policy in situations where the consti-
tutional rights at issue are not perceived as being
'socio-economic' in nature.
Finally, the Court's refusal to become involved in
issues of policy fails to recognise the fact that
sometimes a question put before a judge can be
162 Whyte and Hogan, ].M. Kelly (n. 14 above). p. 122.
163 Unreported, 16 February 2005.
164 While the right to property could be classified as a social
right or used to suppon social rights, this does not appear
to be how it is perceived by the Supreme Court and the
right to property has not been subject to the same degree
of judicial reluctance displayed towards the application
and enforcement of more 'traditional' socio-economic
rights.
165 see n. 79 above, para. 120.
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viewed as both a question of policy and as a ques-
tion of law. l66 For instance, a case where a child
has an unusual form of disability and no provi-
sion has been made by the State to meet his educa-
tional needs; meeting those needs may well entail
issues of policy about the nature, delivery and cost
of the service. However, at the same time, there is
also a plain and simple issue about the failure of
the State to meet the child's explicit constitutional
entitlement under the Constitution. In such a case,
to say that the issue is one of policy and is therefore
not justiciable does not answer the plaintiff's case;
it simply ignores it. 167 This might be viewed as
an abdication of the Court's responsibility to give
a decision on a constitutional question before it.
Martha Minow has pointed out that judicial inac-
tion, as well as judicial action, may impair relation-
ships with other branches and undermine the gov-
ernment's overall obligation to respect persons. l68
While it is definitely important for judges to under-
stand their relationships with other people and
institutions, such understanding is quite different
from ceding responsibility for what ensues. 'The
courts' own responsibilities to the parties before
them cannot be acquitted simply by asserting def-
erence to other branches', 169
7. TD - A FLAWED BALANCING EXERCISE?
In the TD case, Justice Hardiman built upon his
comments in the Sinnott case, in which he empha-
sised that' [the separation of powers] is not a mere
administrative arrangement: it is itself a high con-
stitutional value ... It is an essential part of the
democratic procedures of the State, not inferior in
importance to any article of the Constitution'. 170
In TD, he stated that the High Court's statement
that the Court has to attempt to fill the vacuum
166 Paraphrased from De Blacam..Children. Constitutional
Righcs'(n.161 aboveLp.135.
167 Ibid,
168 She makes this assertion in the context of arguing that
the separation of powers necessarily involves continu-
ous relationships between the branches rather than con-
fining each to entirely distinct fields of competence. M.
Minow. Making All the Difference - Inclusion. Exclusion
and American Law (London: Cornell University Press.
1990). p. 369.
169 Ibid.
170 Sinnott (n. 39 above), at para. 346. Keane CJ expressly
agreed with Hardiman J's analysis of the separation of
powers doctrine (para. 109).
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that exists by reason of the failure of the legis-
lature and executive to vindicate children's con-
stitutional rights came close to 'asserting a gen-
eral residual power in the courts, in the event
of a (judicially determined) failure by the other
branches of government to discharge some (pos-
sibly judicially identified) constitutional dUty'.171
If this were accepted, it would have the effect of
attributing a paramountcy to the judicial branch
of government which was contrary to his view of
the Constitution, under which no branch of gov-
ernment is attributed with 'an overall, or residual,
supervisory power over the others'.I72 He rejected
the premise that 'the boundaries [between the
functions of the different organs] are porous or
capable of being ignored or breached because one
organ rightly or wrongly considers that another
organ is unwise or inadequate in the discharge of
its own duties'.173 Acknowledging the checks and
balances provided by the Constitution (including
that of judicial review of legislation), he further
stated that the existence of such powers does not
suggest that a court, or any other organ of govern-
ment, can strike its own balance, in a particular
case, as to how the separation of powers is to be
observed. 174
These comments are inconsistent with previous
Supreme Court statements that the segregation
of functions under the Irish doctrine of separa-
tion of powers is not absolute,l75 and appear to
ignore the role granted to the Court as guardian of
the rights and principles set out in the Constitu-
tion. 176 Justice Hardiman's remarks on the COUTtS'
inability to strike a balance are especially worthy of
note. They appear to suggest that the courts - who
are undoubtedly the ultimate interpreters of the
Constitution - are not entitled to rule on how the
separation of powers doctrine operates in a partic-
ular situation. It has been pointed out that, con-
trary to what Justice Hardiman suggests, a bal-
ance does have to be struck in such a situation
171 TD In. 40 above). para. 353.
J72 Ibid. para. 350.
173 Ibid. para. 357.
J74 Ibid. para. 352.
175 See Lynham v. Butler (No.2) [) 9331 IR 74 and Abbey fIlms
Umitedv. Attomer Genera11 1981l I.R. 158.
176 For a contrasting ~iew of the separation of powers under
the Irish Constitution and the court's role in relation to
both enforcing the separation of powers and upholding
constitutional rights. see Denham J's dissenting judgment
in TD.
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and that even where the courts refuse to intervene
in executive action, that in itself is striking a bal-
ance. 17t It is clear that the majority in TD consid-
ered the Court's power to vindicate constitutional
rights to be limited by the principle of the separa-
tion of powers. 178 Thus, they regarded their duty
to uphold (a very rigid version) of the separation
of powers doctrine as outweighing their duty to
protect and vindicate the constitutional rights at
issue. 179
Finally, it is also possible to classify the courts'
duty to uphold constitutional socio-economic
rights as an aspect of the judicial function under
the separation of powers (as opposed to being
part and parcel of the principle of constitutional
supremacy). According to this view, judicial inac-
tion or deference in the face ofa failure by the State
to give effect to constitutional socio-economic
rights may itself amount to a breach of the sepa-
ration of powers.
7. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IRISH COURTS
In a celebrated ruling, the Supreme Court asserted
that it has a broad jurisdiction to protect the con-
stitutional rights of citizens, stating that 'no one
can with impunity set these rights at nought or
circumvent them, and the courts' powers in this
regard are as ample as the defence of the Consti-
tution requires'.180 In a later case, the Court stated
further that, "w]here the people by the Consti-
tution create rights against the State or impose
duties upon the State, a remedy to enforce these
must be deemed to be also available'. 181 In a judg-
177 De Blacam, 'Children. Constitutional Rights' (n. 161
above), p. 141.
178 Murray J and Hardiman J stated this expressly. while the
findings of the other judges indicate implicit agreement.
179 It is important to note, however, the Court's later state-
ments in In re Article 26 and the Health (Amendment)
(No.2) Bill where it stated per Murray J that, 'the separa-
tion of powers, involving as it does respect for the powers
of the various organs of State and specifically the power
of the Oireachtas to make decisions on the allocation of
resources, cannot in itself be a justification for the failure
of the State to protect or vindicate a constitutional right'.
180 Per 6 Dalaigh CJ in Stale (Quinn) v. Ryan 119651 I.R. 70,
p.122.
181 Per Walsh J in B)'rnev. Ireland 119721 I.R. 241, p. 281. See
further comments by Walsh J in the same case, pp. 279-
80. For similar comments, see per Budd J in Company of
Ireland Ltd. v. Fitzpatrick (No.2) r19611 I.R. 345, at 36B; per
Walsh J in McGee v. Attorney General 19741 IR 284.
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ment involving the constitutional rights of a child
with a serious personality disorder predating TD,
ChiefJustice Hamilton stated that' [it] is part of the
courts' function to vindicate and defend the rights
guaranteed by Article 40, section 3. If the courts are
under an obligation to defend and vindicate the
personal rights of the citizen, it inevitably follows
that the courts have the jurisdiction to do all things
necessary to vindicate such rights'. 182
The Irish Supreme Court has adopted an extremely
restrictive attitude towards the granting of posi-
tive orders against the State. In Sinnott, several
of the judges' obiter either expressly or implic-
itly indicated a reluctance to grant a mandatory
injunction in a constitutional context. 183 However,
at least two of them acknowledged that there could
be extreme circumstances in which such orders
might be appropriate, but that the facts of this
case were not so extreme as to warrant the grant-
ing ofsuch an order. 184 Subsequently, the Supreme
Court adopted an even harder line on the grant-
ing of mandatory orders against the state in the TD
case.
In the High Court in TD, Justice Kelly had argued
that, in directing the executive to adhere to its
own policy, he was not making policy. However, a
majority of the Supreme Court held that, in grant-
ing the mandatory orders under appeal, which
required the executive power of the State to be
implemented in a specific manner by the expen-
diture of money on defined objects within partic-
ular time limits, Justice Kelly had violated the con-
stitutionally mandated separation of powers. The
majority was of the view that making such orders
involved the High Court effectively detennining
the policy which the executive is to follow in deal-
ing with a particular social problem. 185
182 DC v. F.astern Health Board & Ors 1997 3 I.R. 511, at 522.
Prior to TD, there were other judicial statements in cases
involving children's constitutional rights indicating that.
where appropriate, the Court was entitled to grant injunc-
tive relief to ensure the enforcement of children's consti-
tutional socio-economic rights. See, e.g., DD v. Eastern
Health Board at 7; Comerford v. Minister for Education
1199712 ILRM 134, at 147-8.
183 Geoghegan J (para. 417), Hardiman J (paras. 333-351).
Denham J (para. 156) and Keane CJ (para. 80). Murray and
Fennelly JJ stated that it was not necessary to consider the
issue (paras. 272 and 424 respectively). Murphy J did not
refer to the issue of remedies in the course of his judg-
ment.
184 hDen am J (para. 156) and Geoghegan J (para. 417).
185 Per Keane J (para. 80). See also, Murphy J (paras 224-5).
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According to f\.turray J, such an order should only
be granted where there has been 'a conscious and
deliberate decision by [an] organ of State to act in
breach of its constitutional obligations accompa-
nied by bad faith or recklessness'.l86 In his view,
a court would also have to be satisfied that the
absence of good faith or the reckless disregard of
rights would impinge on the observance by the
State party concerned of any declaratory order
made by the court. 18? Justice Hardiman agreed
with Murray stating that such an order could only
be granted as 'an absolutely final resort in circum-
stances of great crisis and for the protection of the
constitutional order itself. 18B In his view, no such
circumstances that would justify the granting of
such an order had occurred since the enactment
of the Constitution in 1937. 189 According to both
judges, even in such extreme circumstances, the
mandatory order granted might direct the fulfil-
ment of a manifest constitutional obligation, but
should not specify the means or policy to be used
in fulfilling the obligation. 190
The single dissenting judge (Justice Denham)
adopted a different approach, arguing that it was
clear from the case law that in rare and excep-
tional cases (such as this one), to protect con-
stitutional rights, a court may have a jurisdic-
tion. and even a duty. to make a mandatory order
against another branch of government. 191 She fur-
ther pointed out that a decision of a court, even
if it is in relation to a single individual, may affect
policy: 'The expense of the case itself and its out-
come may have profound and far-reaching effects,
Simply because a case affects a policy of an insti-
tution does not per se render it unconstitutional
or bring it into conflict with the principle of the
separation of powers'.192 She disagreed with the
majority that in making an order such as that
granted by the High Court against the executive,
the court was formulating policy. stating instead
186 TD (n. 40 above), para. 232.
187 Ibid.
]88 Ibid. para. 367. It is interesting to note that Hardiman Jdid
not consider th£' circumstances in the case before him as
being of 'great crisis'. Nor did he appear to view the con-
sistent disregard of declaratory orders granted in similar
cases preceding TD by the elected branches of govern-
ment as constituting a threat to the constitutional order.
189 Ibid. para. 367.
190 Per Murray J (para. 232) and per Hardiman J (para. 366).
191 Ihid. 139. See also para. 16.
]92 Ihid. para, 133.
317
that the order merely mandated the State's own
policy. 193
The Irish Supreme Court has thus limited its abil-
ity to grant mandatory orders to such an extent
that it is very unlikely that such an order will
be granted against the state - particularly with
regard to constitutional socio-economic rights.
which raise their own especial concerns in rela-
tion to the doctrine of the separation of powers. 194
On a more constructive note, the TD case was pos-
itive in relation to at least one aspect of enforc-
ing socio-economic rights. While the majority of
]93 Ibid. para. 134.
194 I note, however, that dicta from various Supreme Coun
judges and High Coun decisions suggest that advocates
might have more success in obtaining mandatory orders
where the socio-economic rights obligations at issue are
statutory, rather than constitutional. in nature or where
the services or facilities being demanded are already in
existence. It is interesting to consider Hardiman 1's com-
ment in Sinnott that 'the enforcement of duties imposed
by the legislature is obviously an exercise of a different
kind from the devising or inferring of such duties with-
out legislative intervention' (para. 379). In the TD case,
Hardiman J discussed the possibility that relief could be
afforded to the applicant under legislation (at paras. 261-
2). These dicta appear to imply that it is possible that the
Supreme Coun would have been prepared to adopt a less
restrictive approach to the granting of mandatory orders
where the duties at issue were statutory rather than con-
stitutional in nature. This is arguably borne out by the
High Coun decision in Jeremiah Cronin (a minor) suing
by his mother and next friend Margaret Cronin \'. .Minis-
ter for Education and Science & Ors. Case 11440P of 2003.
In this case, Laffo)' J granted a mandatory interlocutory
order, ordering the Minister for Education and Science
to provide twenty-nine hours hom£' tuition a week to an
autistic child, pending either the securing of an appro-
priate school place for the child or the outcome of his
full action against the State. The complainants alleged
that by failing to prmide educational services appropri-
ate to the child's needs. the defendants were in breach of
their obligations under. amongst other things, the Educa-
tion Act 1998. LatToy stated that. in reaching her conclu-
sion. she had regard to the decision of the Supreme Court
in TD and. in particular, to the observations of (Keane
eJl at page 287 of that judgment. She said that she was
'satisfied that granting a mandatory injunction does not
fall foul of that decision. The relief granted is limited to
the panicular needs of the Plaintiff and merely extends a
programme which the First Defendant has already sanc-
tioned'. According to O'Mahony. 'Itlhis analysis would
suggest that the restriction imposed in TD on mandatory
relief applies only to orders which require the implemen-
tation of whole new ranges of services or facilities and
does not apply to individual plaintiffs who wish to be pro-
vided with facilities or services which are already in place.
(C. O'Mahony. 'A New Slant on Educational Rights and
Mandatory Injunctions?' Dublin Uni!'ersity Law Journal.
Vol. 27 (2005). pp. 363-367, at 365).
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the Supreme Court refused to grant a mandatory
order on the basis that doing so would constitute
a violation of the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers, they did not base their decision on inherent
judicial incapacity to grant such an order. In fact,
their judgments make it clear that in some extreme
circumstances the courts could grant a mandatory
order. This would suggest that the Court does not
regard itself as institutionally incapable of formu-
lating complex mandatory orders.
8. CONCLUSION: FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS?
This final section focuses on means by which
socio-economic rights may be accorded a greater
level of protection within the Irish legal order in
future.
One way in which the restrictive approach adop-
ted by the Irish courts to socio-economic rights
might be addressed is by amending the Irish
Constitution by referendum so as to include
socio-economic rights. The recent developments
with regard to the possible future amendment
of the constitution to afford greater protection
to children's rights have already been discussed.
However, recommendations that the constitution
be altered so as to include socio-economic rights
have not been made solely in this context. In 1996,
a majority of the Constitutional Review Group
(CRG) rejected arguments in favour of including in
the Constitution 'a personal right to freedom from
poverty or of specific personal economic rights'
(Le., socio-economic rights).195 This was largely
due to concerns that rendering such rights justi-
ciable would lead to a distortion of democracy by
according judges power in relation to policy and
budgetary matters that were more appropriately
left to the elected branches of government. The
CRG were also of the opinion that a right to free-
dom from poverty would not be capable of objec-
tive determination and that the elected branches
ofgovernment might be placed in a position where
they would have no discretion in relation to what
amount of revenue would be necessary in order
to satisfy such right. l96 This was an extremely dis-
appointing development for proponents of socio-
economic rights. It served to demonstrate the
195 See CRG, Report (n. I above). pp. 234-6.
196 For more on this, see ibid.
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misperceptions about socio-economic rights (and
what judicial adjudication of them would entail)
that underlay (and continue to underlie) the atti-
tudes of legal professionals and others in Ireland.
Another means by which the Irish judiciary
might positively develop its socio-economic rights
jurisprudence is through more extensive reference
to, and emplOYment of, international law in its
interpretation of the rights set out in the Consti-
tution.
In addition, the passing of the European Con-
vention of Human Rights Act (ECHR Act) in 2003
means that there is a new, albeit statutory, source
of norms to be employed to give effect either
directly or indirectly to socio-economic rights
claims. Section 3(l} of the Act requires every organ
of the state to perform its function in a manner
compatible with the State's obligation under the
convention provisions. This includes those con-
vention obligations which have implications for
the enforcement of socio-economic rights. The
passing of the Act has increased the extent to
which the ECHR is relied on and cited in Irish
courts requiring, as it does, that, in interpreting
and applying any statutory provision or rule of law,
courts shall, as far as is possible 'do so in a manner
compatible with the State's obligations under the
Convention provisions'.197 The Act also provides
that judicial notice must be taken of, inter alia,
the Convention provisions and jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 198
and that, when interpreting and applying the Con-
vention provisions, courts must take due account
of the principles laid down in, amongst other
things, such decisions and judgments. Amongst
other things, the Act empowers the High Court and
the Supreme Court to make a declaration that a
statutory provision or rule of law is incompatible
with the State's obligations under the Convention,
where no other legal remedy is adequate or avail-
able. 199
In the United Kingdom, courts at all levels
have relied on jurisprudence of the ECtHR in
197 Section 2, ECHR Act 2003. For information on how the
Act has operated since its introduction, see D. O'Connell,
S. Cummiskey, E. Meeneghan & P. O'Connell, ECHR
Act 2003: A Preliminary Assessment of Impact (Dublin:
Law Society of Ireland/Dublin Solicitors Bar Association,
2006).
198 Ibid. Section 4.
199 Ibid. Section 5.
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considering socio-economic rights-related claims
brought under the UK Human Rights Act 1998. It
was hoped that the Irish courts would adopt a sim-
ilar approach when dealing with socio-economic
rights-related cases arising under the ECHR Act.
Initially, however. there were relatively few cases
in which the legislation was cited. In the case
of Dublin City Council v. Fennell.2°O the Irish
Supreme Court held that the ECHR Act did not
operate rPtrospectively, either to past events (i.e.
events prior to the coming into force of the Act).
actions that have already been initiated or pend-
ing litigation. This decision meant that it was some
time before the Irish courts (and particularly the
Supreme Court) were able to develop jurispru-
dencp under the Act.
There is a growing body of housing rights case law
developing under the Act as a result of claimants
bringing complaints based on Article 8 ECHR
(right to respect for private and farnily life, home
and correspondence). There have been a num-
ber of positive decisions in which the High Court
has found the State not to be in compliance \Nith
its obligations under Article 8. In one instance.
this occurred where a local authority failed to pro-
vide appropriate mobile home accommodation to
members of a Traveller family living with severe
200 120051lESC 33.
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physical disabilities.2OJ In another case. a section
of the Housing Act 1966 was found to be in breach
of Article 8, which set out a summary procedure
for the recovery of possession of dwellings by local
authorities from their tenants but did not pro-
vide adequate procedural safeguards.2u2 Unfortu-
nately. this judicial willingness to engage progres-
sively \ovith the State's obligations under Article 8
does not appear to be shared by all members of the
bench.2cn
All in all. these developments taken together with
the recent decisions involving the right to civil
legal aid. as well as the Supreme Court's failure
to expressly reject the existence of further unenu-
merated socia-economic rights in the case of In
the Matter of re Article 26 of the Constitution
and the Health (Amendment)(IVo. 2), suggest that
the debate on the judicial enforceability of socio-
economic rights in Ireland has not been foreclosed
by the decisions in TD and Sinnott.
201 O'Donnell \'. Sowh Dublin County COlillcil. Record
No.2006/14. 22 Mav 2007.
202 See M. Carolan. 'J'udge finds Housing Code~ Breaches
Rights' Irish 7imfls. 9 ~lay 2008. referring to (he decision
of Latloy J in Donegan \'. Dublin Council and thfl Attomey
(;flllflral. High Court. 8 \lay 200A.
201 See. e.g.. [)oherty & Anor. Y. SOlal1 DulJlin CO/Illty Council
12007/ JEHC 4; Leonar(/\·. Dublill City Council + Ors i:!008]
JEHC 79.
